

# MR Review Essay

## Embedded: The Media at War in Iraq

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When U.S. Army General Dwight D. Eisenhower described reporters at his headquarters as “quasi-staff officers,” few showed the slightest resentment. In fact, many of the journalists at British Army General Bernard Montgomery’s headquarters were reportedly considering outright enlistment.

As an option for war correspondents, enlistment seemed to fade after those first patriotic days, but the urge by reporters (and their editors) to get ever closer to the action continued unabated. By the Vietnam war, 600 to 700 reporters became war correspondents merely by appearing on the scene. But even in those days of information overload, reporters still had to take it upon themselves to find the battles and get to the scene pretty much through their own ingenuity or prestige.

Recently, Pentagon official Bryan Whitman was tasked with putting together a program for Operation Iraqi Freedom that would supplant the almost universally unloved “press pools” that had sputtered along for a decade. Whitman took a new look at embedding reporters—the media all the while acknowledging that by doing so he would “get reporting of the good, the bad, and the ugly.”

The term “embedded media,” itself, probably a spin-off from “cyberese,” has been around the military since at least the Persian Gulf war to describe reporters who were housed with combat units. So Whitman did not invent embedding, he simply took real war in real time into more American living rooms than any reporting of any armed conflict in history.

Whitman also had to guard against unjust results of embedding, such as that produced by reporter Tom Ricks in a 1995 *Wall Street Journal* article in which he describes how

during a soldiers’ briefing before deployment to Bosnia, he overheard a U.S. Army colonel expressing the opinion that the U.S. commitment in Bosnia could exceed Washington’s forecast of one year.<sup>1</sup> The fallout from Ricks’ article was that the colonel’s once-promising career did not last much more than a year after his Bosnia tour was over. Ironically, the U.S. military presence in Bosnia has now reached 8 years and counting.

By the time Operation Iraqi Freedom was spinning up, the unfortunate colonel’s words were forgotten, Bosnia was on the back burner, and “real time” was the buzzword. Editors were pushing to cover the war from the front, alongside the troops, in real time. Meanwhile, according to Whitman, as quoted in Bill Katovsky and Timothy Carlson’s book *Embedded: The Media At War In Iraq*, the Pentagon was seeking ways to mitigate Saddam Hussein’s decade of success with his constantly shifting campaign of denial, deception, and outright lies.<sup>2</sup> A solution came to mind that seemed to please everyone—resurrect embedding for independent, uncensored reporters who would definitely not consider themselves as quasi-staff officers.

With reporters wed to a military unit on the battlefield, the relationship would be symbiotic. Self-censorship could be expected if reporters knew that exposure of operational secrets would crank enemy artillery around their foxholes following the 6 o’clock news. In addition, reporters throughout the battlefield could, in real time, refute Saddam’s disinformation. So instead of a Pentagon spokesman saying, “Today we had an incident and some civilians were killed,” we read *Washington Post* reporter William Branigin’s account of an incident at a roadblock when, for whatever

reason, several Iraqi citizens ended up dead because their speeding car refused to yield to repeated warnings.<sup>3</sup> Branigin tells the story exactly as it happened and includes a wrenching account of how the soldiers considered this the darkest day of their lives.

Through more than 60 interviews, co-authors Katovsky and Carlson allowed Operation Iraqi Freedom war correspondents and photographers from organizations giant and small to engage in a frank after-action review. The highly readable but eclectic accounts take intensely personal paths, ranging from the low road of braggadocio and evaluation of ration enchiladas to the high road of introspective and constructive criticism.

*Detroit News* reporter John Bebow concedes that as an embed, “I can’t give you this gigantic wide-ranging view of the war. All a guy like me [sic] can do is give really detailed gut-wrenching snapshots of what’s going on.”<sup>4</sup> *CBS Evening News* correspondent Jim Axelrod admits he was scared at the front. (If there is a common theme among most of the embedded reporters, this would be it.) All embeds were equal, but some emerged as more equal than others (Ted Koppel) and some as less equal (Gerald Rivera).

Katovsky and Carlson do not limit their narrative to war correspondents. Peace activist Marla Ruzicka has her say, as do Whitman; Army media troubleshooter Colonel Guy Shields; and Sergeant Major Carol Sobel, a military public affairs veteran who enthusiastically said, “I felt like this was the first time I was able to do what we always talked about doing, getting the word out by using the media to tell the story.”<sup>5</sup>

Venturing into the future, Sobel urged some method of protecting

non-embedded journalists rather than telling them, as she did in Iraq when straying reporters asked the Army for help, "We are not AAA."<sup>6</sup> And there will certainly be a next time. Embedding on a lesser scale continues today in Iraq. At a recent seminar, the Navy's information chief said, "There is no way to back out of the embedding process. It's here to stay."<sup>7</sup>

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, Al Jazeera correspondent Amr El-Kakhy was given an embed. When El-Kakhy reported that he was inside the northern port at Umm Qasr with

the U.S. Marines while Baghdad was at the same time claiming that the port was holding out against the Americans, he was villified by Saddam's government. At that point, Whitman must have seen the light at the end of the tunnel. Thanks to embedding, Saddam's claims were being refuted by the source with the greatest credibility in the entire Arab world.

El-Kakhy's experiences were not all positive, however. He felt that he never really got to the "front lines." But at that, El-Kakhy was treated

better than Geraldo, whose handshake on his departure was what soldiers describe with thinly veiled euphemism as a "stink-palm." (For elaboration, see page 140 of the book.) **MR**

#### NOTES

1. For a discussion of the subject, see on-line at <<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02autumn/belknap.htm>>.
2. Bill Katovsky and Timothy Carlson, *Embedded: The Media At War In Iraq* (Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press, 2003).
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Michael Pasquarett, "Reporters On the Ground: The Military and the Media's Joint Experience During Operation Iraqi Freedom, 08-03 (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Center For Strategic Leadership, October 2003).

## A Short History of Moroccan Armed Forces

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**God:** *Creator of all destiny, by His Mercy we draw from, He ordains our choice to right path.*

**Nation:** *Land that begets our bounty, from which we sustain ourselves we protect its integrity from and defend it from all enemies.*

**King:** *Our commander and guide, he guides our renaissance and development, protector of our people's rights."*

—Motto of the Moroccan Armed Forces.<sup>1</sup>

The Kingdom of Morocco has much to be proud of; for example, it has been a long-time Middle East ally to the United States, being the first country to recognize the United States as a nation in 1777. Moroccan officers also are quick to tell us of King Mohammed Bin Youssaf's Mohammed V's refusal to surrender Moroccan Jews to the Vichy (pro-Nazi) French Government and certain death in Nazi concentration camps.

Today, Morocco has a moderate government in which the monarch, who can trace his lineage to the Prophet Muhammad, challenges militant ideology and encourages Islamic scholars to dispel the twisted theology that produces mass murder. Morocco, as a guardian of maritime commerce along the Gibraltar Strait and a nation that has recently contributed peacekeepers to Kosovo and Bosnia, has great potential to become a moderating force in the Middle East.

*Al-Jaysh Al-Maghribi Abr Al-Tareekh* (The Moroccan Army throughout history) by Abdul-Haq Al-Merini offers Arab readers a glimpse of Moroccan military history.<sup>2</sup> Al-Merini has written biographies and collected speeches of the late Moroccan King Mohammed V and also King Hassan II, who died in 1999. Al-Merini, who received his doctorate in literature, is a prolific writer of history. The book won Morocco's prize for literature in 1968 and has become a timeless military classic among North African officers in Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, and Tunisia.

Al-Merini begins his book, which is enthralling from beginning to end, by discussing the frustrations Roman legions faced while pacifying Moroccan tribesmen. He mentions the importance of Moroccan tribes in the Islamic expansion beginning in A.D. 711 and concludes with Morocco's roles in World War II, Operation Desert Storm, and peacekeeping operations in the Congo, Somalia, and the Balkans. Understanding the Moroccan military will help further the relationship between U.S. and Moroccan Armed Forces, particularly as both nations are committed to battling Islamic militancy and terrorism.

### World War II

The first inkling of Morocco's pro-U.S. stance came with Mohammed V's proclamation on 7 September 1938: "I wish to confirm with the

highest and clearest voice that Morocco's King and his subjects will offer unified resistance and will side with France."<sup>3</sup> Despite the famous Humphrey Bogart movie *Casablanca*, which featured a host of Nazi, Allied, and Vichy French spies, the Moroccan position during the war was quite clear; it picked the Allied cause against fascism.<sup>4</sup>

On 3 September 1939, Moroccan mosques issued in poetic prose, a royal proclamation that reminded its citizens of World War I's effect on society, emphasizing the need to back France once again against the Germans. What also motivated the Moroccans was a belief that nations under French and British colonialism would be given their independence once victory over Germany was achieved.

**German Blitzkrieg 1940.** On 3 September 1939, the Moroccans organized a brigade of 2,300 fighters in Meknes. The brigade was part of the 1st Moroccan Division, which included the 1st, 3d, and 7th Moroccan Infantry Regiments. The regiments were sent to France and positioned along the Belgian border under the command of French forces. After marching 130 kilometers in 3 days, the Moroccans witnessed Adolf Hitler's 10 May 1940 blitzkrieg and German forces' engagements on 14 and 15 May. There is no information about how the Moroccans were defeated tactically, but Al-Merini

mentions that of the 2,300 Moroccans sent as part of the Belgian Campaign, only 50 returned to Meknes after the liberation of Europe in 1945. A footnote to the chapter on World War II contains the unit citation (A l'ordre de l'Armée) bestowed on the 7th Moroccan Regiment by the French War Ministry. The citation acknowledges Moroccan forces for bravery while engaged in hand-to-hand combat against German units as well as their proficiency with bayonets.

In 1989, French and Belgian veterans gathered in Brussels to memorialize those who died in the German blitzkrieg in Belgium. Part of the ceremony involved reading verses from the *Quran* in memory of the valiant Moroccans who died defending the Benelux countries.

**Anfa Conference 1943.** In January 1943, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, American President Franklin D. Roosevelt, French General Charles DeGaulle, and King Mohammed V met for 4 days in the Casablanca suburb of Anfa to map out a strategy for the war. The Anfa Conference is significant because it is where the Allies first agreed on the demand for an "unconditional surrender" of the Axis powers.

A highlight of the conference was a dinner party hosted by Roosevelt in honor of Mohammed V and his son Moulay Hassan. Roosevelt's recognition of the Moroccan Sovereign as host of the conference and as a ruler of importance gave credibility to Moroccan aspirations for independence. Roosevelt asserted that the King should not allow other countries to exploit Morocco's natural resources. Roosevelt is also reported to have said that he would do all in his power to support Morocco's wish to gain its independence from France. At the conclusion of the conference, the King proclaimed: "A new future for my country."

Casablanca and the Algerian port of Oran received the bulk of North African Allied landings during Operation Torch. Al-Merini discusses French infighting between Auguste Paul Nogues the pro-Vichy French Governor-General to Morocco; DeGaulle; and French General Henri Honore Giraud, who supported the

Allied landings in North Africa.

The initial landings of Operation Torch involved U.S. and Free French Army units engaging pro-Nazi Vichy French formations under Nogues. Battles occurred off the Moroccan coastal towns of Ahsfee, Mahdia, and Buzineeqah. Nogues encouraged King Mohammed V to move his capital from Rabat to Fez to be closer to the Axis defenses, but the Moroccan monarch refused, choosing instead to honor his commitment to the Anfa Conference and to the Allied cause.

The arrival of U.S. General George S. Patton's 5,000 troops and 250 tanks turned the tide of Vichy French resistance to the Allies. The final fierce fighting for the Axis cause was an attempt to capture the Moroccan capital of Rabat, but Marshal Henri Philippe Petain authorized Nogues to negotiate a cease-fire with General Dwight D. Eisenhower in Algiers. Once Morocco was secure, it served as a major base for U.S. bombers and as a logistics center for the push toward Tunisia and Sicily. On 18 November 1942, Nogues and Patton attended the annual celebration of King Mohammed V's ascension. The monarch publicly reaffirmed his commitment to the Allies by contributing 12,000 Moroccan troops to the Allied forces.

**Italy 1942-1944.** The 12,000 Moroccan troops that joined the Allies included infantry, artillery, anti-air units, and engineering companies that were trained on U.S. and French military munitions. The first destination of the Moroccan formation was to join trained Tunisians to fight a combined German-Italian occupation force in Tunisia. Battles to liberate Tunisia lasted 6 months.

Elements of the Moroccan division were split up and joined with other Algerian and Tunisian units attached to Allied forces liberating the islands of Corsica and Elbe. By securing these islands along with Tunisia, the Straits of Messina lay open to Sicily. From November 1943 to January 1944, the Moroccans became bogged down as they made their way from an amphibious assault near Naples toward Mount Cassino. The Moroccans used dynamite, grenades, and flamethrowers to take out

each defensive position.

In 1944, Moroccan units joined the task force formed to assault the Gustav and Sigfried lines. Moroccan units played an important role in breaking the siege at Anzio, fighting alongside the Allies for 20 days. The Moroccans also joined the Allies in the summer of 1944 to liberate Rome.

**Final Invasion of Germany 1944-1945.** It was necessary to regroup and re-equip 6,000 Moroccan troops to augment the 12,000 exhausted Moroccan troops who were fighting in North Africa and Italy. Fresh Moroccan forces, along with battle-hardened troops, took part in the capture of Florence (June 1944) and in the amphibious assault on Marseilles. Making their way into France from the east, the Moroccans were once again directly attacking along the Alps and the hills of Tuscany. By October-November 1944, the Moroccans were fighting in winter conditions along the Rhine.

A Moroccan honor guard marched with Allied forces along the Champs Elysées in August 1944. Moroccan forces joined the First French Army to liberate France and then helped guard the French sector in postwar Germany.

According to Al Merini, 8,000 Moroccan soldiers lost their lives, 28,000 soldiers were wounded, and 7,000 became prisoners of war (POWs). One-thousand Moroccans were awarded the Campaign de la Liberation, and 500 were posthumously awarded French, British, and American awards for valor. The French government gave King Mohammed V and Crown Prince Hassan II the Order of Liberation.

Throughout 1945, Morocco worked with the Allies to repatriate its POWs from Axis camps. The French cited specific tribes like the Zayan and Zummur tribes for excellence in commando tactics. Moroccan Army commanders were cited for bravery and leadership; for example Idris Ben-Taher was credited with helping capture the French town of Montpellier. The 2d and 7th Moroccan Regiments received Belgium's Legion of Honor in 1947 for their actions in 1940 against an unstoppable German blitzkrieg.

## **National Liberation Army 1947-1956**

Only military students of French academies and those with a passion for the Vietnam war know that Moroccan troops participated in the French War in Indochina. Moroccan forces witnessed Ho Chi Minh and his guerrillas drain French forces and the foreign legionnaires, which culminated in their defeat in Diem Bien Phu. Moroccans and Algerians wondered if the same tactics would apply to their own countries, which led to the formation of the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria and the National Liberation Army (ALN) in Morocco. The FLN and ALN were dedicated to ridding Algeria and Morocco respectively of French rule.

The early organization of the ALN consisted of cells of 25 operatives (14 civilian and 11 military) representing one vanguard and a vanguard squad leader. Cells were put under different levels of command and employed in guerrilla operations against lone French outposts. In hindsight, and in recognition of the contributions Moroccans made to World War II, the French might have worked toward a more peaceful transition to Moroccan self-rule. Instead, Paris dragged its feet. It took a political solution and a guerrilla vanguard to gain independence for Morocco (July 1956) almost 11 years after the end of World War II. Many of the armed ALN cells based themselves in the middle Atlas Mountains and the Rift Valley. ALN leader Abdulkareem Al-Khateeb developed and implemented the idea of recruiting Moroccan officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in the French Army within ALN ranks.

King Mohammed V and Crown Prince Hassan strove to collect all the elements of Moroccan formations into one Moroccan Armed Force. When Morocco gained its independence in 1956, Moroccans were fighting under French and Spanish flags as well as with the ALN. Hassan went to Paris to negotiate the transition for self-rule and to establish a Moroccan Armed Force of 15,000 troops.

Field Marshal Mohammed Ammzyan negotiated with Francisco Franco for the transfer of 10,000 Moroccan troops who, like Ammzyan, had served in the Spanish Army.

From 1956 until March 1961, the French, who could have easily opted for a revolutionary war, withdrew 90,000 troops from Morocco. The transfer involved the absorption of 5,000 ALN fighters who were entrenched in the Atlas Mountains and the Rift Valley.

Mohammed V went directly to ALN leaders to acknowledge their contributions to the Nation's independence. He offered each fighter the opportunity to join the Moroccan Armed Forces and employed many of them as border guards. He instituted a 9-month training program to ease the Moroccan's transition to the regular army, and he brought ALN leaders and formations to the palace in Rabat to go through a military inspection and a presentation of colors before the King. The book offers a valuable lesson about assimilating a liberation army into society, retaining its dignity, and recognizing its military value to a newly independent nation. In the 1960s, many Moroccans were sent to Spanish, French, and U.S. military schools, a trend that continues today. Al-Merini also lists 22 schools within Morocco that are affiliated with the military. The Moroccan military is proud of its officer and NCO academic achievements. Lieutenant Colonel Abdelkader Al-Marboo and Major Mohammed Raffei attended the French Higher Military College, and during the 1989-1990 academic year, organized a symposium on European Defense in the 21st Century. In the spring of 1991, Moroccans published the Air Force magazine *L'Espace Marocaine*, which emphasizes military thought and formulates new theories on security.

On 8 November 1956, Moroccan Armed Forces developed a national security structure. A High Council for National Defense, chaired by the king, was created. The council included a prime minister, a minister of labor, an interior minister, and a minister of national economy. The council oversees the affairs of the Defense Ministry and aids in civil control over the military. The council also combines all elements of national power, economics, human resources, and internal policing to address matters of national security—a lesson

Egypt learned only after the debacle of the 1967 Six-Day War.

Morocco's unique military organization Al-Deerk Al-Malaki (Royal Guards) not only protects the monarch but provides security in courts, military policing, port security, and airport security. The essence of Morocco's uniformed services is summed up in a speech King Hassan II made declaring that his army is a democratic army that is a school for the Nation. Military service is compulsory for all citizens.

The book also chronicles the effect the Moroccan Armed Forces have had in the internal development of Morocco. They have built bridges, repaired roads, provided technical help to farmers, repaired dams, and distributed meal rations to the needy during the holy month of Ramadan.

## **Activity Since 1960**

**Congo 1960-1961.** The Moroccans became highly active in peacekeeping, sending two battalions to the Congo under the command of General Hammu Al-Kitani. The force included Royal Guard and Regular Army units that integrated well under Al-Kitani's command. They interacted with Katangan Separatist Rebels, reorganized the Congolese police force, restored order in villages, surveyed a dam, and reopened the port of Boma along the Congo River.

**Arab-Israeli wars 1967 and 1973.** Moroccan forces arrived too late to participate in the Six-Day War, but sent forces to the Egyptian and Syrian fronts in the 1973 Yom-Kippur War. Golan (Syrian) Front units and Moroccan units were under the command of General Abdelsalam Al-Safrewi. Faced with Israeli armor, the Moroccans armed their infantry with bazookas.

On the Egyptian front they made a more effective contribution under the command of Colonel-Major (brigadier general) Hassan Al-Hatmee. Moroccan Desert units, which were positioned around the town of Suez, built defensive perimeters along Bir Azeib, a strategic location that controlled access to the two roads leading to Cairo (the Suez to Cairo road and the Ras-al-Abadiyah to Hilwan road). Moroc-

can troops returned from Egypt and Syria in April 1974.

**Congo 1977.** In 1977, the Moroccans increased their presence in the Congo, responding to a call from the Organization of African Unity to bring peace and stability to the Congo (then called Zaire). Under the command of Colonel Abdelkader Lubarees, and with the aid of French transports, the Moroccans landed 1,300 troops. Their mission was to put down a communist insurgency in Katanga Province. While battling Cuban and Angolan forces, the Moroccans captured Soviet hardware, including SAM-7 missiles.

**Western Sahara Since 1975.** The former Spanish Sahara borders Morocco, and before Spanish colonialism of the area in 1885, the region was an autonomous area administered by the Moroccan monarchy. Al-Merini describes how members of the ALN were directed to combat Spanish units as early as 1958. Members of the ALN even waged attacks on French forces in Tindouf (southwestern Algeria) to relieve pressure from the FLN, which from 1954 to 1962 fought for its independence from France.

After Spain withdrew from the Spanish Sahara in 1975, Morocco and Mauritania mobilized forces, with Morocco occupying two-thirds of the territory. The Moroccans staged a "Green March," in which 300,000 of its citizens and troops marched with *Qurans* to reclaim Moroccan territory. This issue has become the single most defining aspect in Moroccan nationalism today. A prolonged guerrilla war ensued, in which the Algerian-supported Polisario fought for its independence from Western Sahara. The conflict remains unresolved.

**Mauritania 1977 to 1979.** Twelve thousand Moroccan troops were dispatched to Mauritania to help combat Polisario separatists. Algeria supported the Polisario as part of its strategy of adopting an anti-West rejectionist front. Morocco, as a pro-U.S. monarchy, was ripe for attack by Egypt's strongman Gamal Abdel-Nasser and the pan-Arabists. The Western Sahara War continued until the UN brokered a cease-fire in 1991. Before the cease-fire, the Moroccans

built a series of sand barriers along the border of Algeria and the Western Sahara designed to limit desert raiding. The barriers were highly effective, leaving the Polisario few avenues of escape.

**Central African Republic 1979.** After the September coup that had freed the Nation of a military dictatorship, the Moroccans dispatched a security contingent in equatorial Africa to restore order to the Central African Republic. No information in the book reveals the size of this Moroccan force.

**Persian Gulf War 1990-1991.** During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, King Hassan II sent a Moroccan force of 1,300 troops to Saudi Arabia and 1,000 troops to the United Arab Emirates. The troops came with tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missiles and Milan antitank missiles, jeeps, trucks, communications cars, water tanks, and repair trucks. The force's task organization was based on how it fought in Western Sahara.

**Somalia 1992.** The Moroccan forces that were sent to Somalia were task-organized to provide humanitarian relief. The force included 1,250 combat troops and 50 military medical personnel serving under the command of Colonel (Doctor) Alaal Farraj. Among the Moroccans who arrived with their forces in Somalia was Helima Merri, a female Moroccan physician from the Ministry of Health, who with 36 civilian doctors and their support staff opened a second Moroccan field hospital. Publicizing Merri's role could encourage other Arab armies to see the leadership potential of professional Arab women. A social service contingency led by Captain Fidwi Binani provided Somalis with counseling and psychological services.

In mid-June 1993, a combined Moroccan-French force swept an area of Mogadishu that was controlled by

militia loyal to Mohammed Farrah Aidid. An ensuing exchange of fire led to the death of Colonel Abdullah Binmamous and 4 Moroccan soldiers and injury to 40 Moroccan citizens. Al-Merini discusses the importance of the Islamic contingent that attacked Aidid, who was holding Muslims hostage and using innocent civilians in his war against other factions. After Binmamous's death, the Moroccans doubled their efforts and with the French took over the Balee Doo-Ghlee section of the city, capturing over 100 of Aidid's militia and impounding numerous weapons.

On 21 June 1993, King Hassan II sent Crown Prince Mohammed to oversee the return of the Moroccan soldiers who had died in the battle to secure Balee Doo-Ghlee and to ensure that proper honors were rendered to them. The Moroccans, who arrived in Somalia in December 1992 and left in April 1994, policed major districts of Mogadishu, guarding relief convoys centers and the airport. They also relieved Pakistani peacekeepers in the UN security operation called Mansoor II.

**Bosnia 1996.** In March 1996, 1,200 Moroccan troops left the port of Agadir as part of a UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. The troops positioned themselves around Mount Igman to provide security to Sarajevo and to reinforce French forces. They provided protection to UN and NATO convoys and security to the city of Mostar; guarded a valuable airstrip; and sent forces to Gorazde.

### **Morocco—An Arab Ally**

According to Al-Merini, the United States needs moderate Arab friends who have played a constructive role in ensuring stability around the world and who have thwarted the forces of intolerance and hate. Morocco's military history demonstrates the kind of Arab ally who can

play a major role in various operations from the current stabilization of Iraq to assisting in Liberia. Europe and the United States need to continue to cultivate Morocco and the fruitful role it plays in the world.

Al-Merini's book describes Morocco's importance as a moderate Islamic representative in Bosnia and Somalia. By joining the United States and Europe, Morocco is a bright ex-

ample of how the Arab League should act in future conflicts. Al-Merini encourages U.S. military planners to recognize the positive contribution of Arab forces and understand how vital it is to combat religious militancy and acts of terror around the world.

*Al-Jaysh Al-Maghribi abr Al-Tareekh* is an important book. Translating and assessing would

further understanding between Moroccan and American uniformed services and capitalize on our Arab and Muslim ally's military potential. **MR**

#### NOTES

1. This translation of the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces motto, which graces every military base, banner, and ship, is from Abdul-Haq Al-Merini, *Al-Jaysh Al-Maghribi Abrams-Al-Tareekh* (The Moroccan Army throughout history), 5th ed. (Rabat, Morocco: Dar Al-Hashr Al Maarifah, 1968).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. *Casablanca* (Burbank, CA: Warner Brothers, 1942).

## MR Book Reviews

**ASWIFT, ELUSIVE SWORD: What if Sun Tzu and John Boyd did a National Defense Review?** Chester W. Richards, Center for Defense Information, Washington, DC, 2001, 84 pages, price unavailable.

Two cheers for Chester W. Richards. His slim book provides a welcome reminder that simply providing more high-technology hardware to the U.S. military will not solve all of our security problems.

Richards is a disciple of the late military thinker Air Force Colonel John Boyd. Boyd is probably best known for his notion of besting an adversary by "getting inside his OODA (observe, orient, decide, and act) loop." Richards repeatedly cites Boyd's recipe for making a force effective: people, ideas, and hardware, in that order. Unfortunately, Richards undercuts his insight by using ideas about maneuver warfare that were popular 20 years ago.

Boyd drew on the legendary Chinese strategist Sun Tzu in developing his own thinking on conflict. However, Richards inflicts a discussion on ch'i (unorthodox) and cheng (orthodox) approaches to strategy, and the tao (way) of war to introduce the idea that the enemy's will and cohesion are a commander's true objective, and that employing military power is but one component of national strategy.

Richards leaps to the operational level, borrowing from maneuver warfare's intellectual thinkers, including William Lind and Michael Wyly, to posit the type of military the

United States ought to field. He includes retired Major Don Vandergriff's personnel prescriptions for reforming the Army's officer corps, which recently gained a modicum of notoriety when he presented them to Army Vice Chief of Staff, General John M. Keane.

Richards' original contributions include his discovery of a new law of combat effectiveness—"the side with the most expensive weapons loses"—and his modest proposal to eliminate the U.S. Army and cede the landpower role to the U.S. Marine Corps.

Richards and other self-styled military reformers are definitely on to something in recognizing the salience of quality people, training, and leadership as part of any Transformation effort. However, this is done much more persuasively by critical writers such as Michael O'Hanlon, Lawrence Korb, Boyd, and even Sun Tzu.

**COL Alan Cate, USA, Miami, Florida**

**SACRED SECRETS: How Soviet Intelligence Operations Changed American History**, Jerrold and Leona Schecter, Brassey's Inc., Washington, DC, 2002, 403 pages, \$26.95.

Since the end of the Cold War, a wave of declassified espionage-related records, both in the East and in the West, has resulted in a variety of scholarly works illuminating a subject that has long been in the shadows. This genre is the one husband-and-wife team Jerrold and Leona Schecter

explore in *Sacred Secrets: How Soviet Intelligence Operations Changed American History*.

The subtitle suggests that Soviet intelligence operations have had a profound effect on the direction of U.S. history. Unfortunately, the authors do not deliver on this proposition for three simple reasons. First, they try to show how the intervention of Soviet intelligence changed the direction of history, suggesting for example, that the manipulations of Soviet spies, such as Harry Dexter White, were what led to Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor.

The authors also rely on Soviet archives to understand historical issues. However, there is an absence of such material in the authors' footnotes. Not that there are no references to archival material, rather it is how the authors cite their references. In the preface they state, "Russian intelligence documents are cited in the footnotes without specific details. Copies . . . have been presented to the Hoover Library where they will be available to scholars and researchers in ten years." Unfortunately, there is no explanation for this peculiar arrangement, which precludes other scholars from examining and assessing the authors' research.

Instead of using original Russian archival material, the majority of the book's footnotes are either memoirs of former Soviet intelligence operatives or Western secondary sources, which supply little new information. The use of archival sources would

have bolstered the credibility of public sources. The authors claim to rely extensively on the recently declassified Verona messages, which were U.S. intercepts of Russian communications, but again there is an absence of Soviet archival material to amplify their use of the Verona material.

The Schecters rely extensively on the published memoirs of Soviet spymaster Pavel Sudoplatov, *Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness—A Soviet Spymaster* (Little Brown & Co., Boston, 1954), which the Schecters edited based on their interviews of Sudoplatov. Sudoplatov's work contains several highly charged claims, including allegations that a number of atomic scientists such as J. Robert Oppenheimer and Leo Szilard were Soviet agents. These allegations are repeated in the Schecters' book without any additional support. In response to these claims some academics suggest that the Schecters manipulated the memory of an old man through a series of leading questions. Furthermore, some of the facts Sudoplatov supplies are questionable.

The final problem is that the last third of the book has nothing to do with the effect of Soviet intelligence on U.S. history. Among the issues is a short biography of former Soviet Foreign Minister Maksim Litvinov; an explanation of how Western intelligence sources acquired a copy of Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech on Joseph Stalin; and the revealing story of the authors' own roles in acquiring Khrushchev's memoirs for publication. While these are all interesting, one wonders what they have to do with the main theme of the book.

The authors also include a long chapter on the evolution of U.S. aerial surveillance of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the chapter contains nothing new. The only reason to read this book relates to the very issues that need to be further substantiated, which the readers are not allowed to do for another 10 years. In the interim, readers might wait for other historians to do a better job.

**John C. Binkley, Ph.D., University of Maryland, College Park**

**ONCE UPON A TOWN: The Miracle of the North Platte Canteen**, Bob Greene, William Morrow, NY, 2002, 265 pages, \$24.95.

Near Christmas of 1941, the people of North Platte, Nebraska, heard that their local soldiers were coming through town on a troop train. Deciding to give the boys a homecoming party, they brought food and drink to the Union Pacific depot. But to the dismay of the townspeople, their boys were not on the train—all of the troops were strangers. The organizers decided to go ahead as planned, and the soldiers responded so positively that the townspeople decided to do it all over again.

Throughout the war and for half a year after the war, the townspeople of North Platte and the surrounding communities met every troop train that passed through. Despite being hindered by wartime rationing, they brought cakes, pies, fried chicken, sandwiches, milk, and coffee; they offered smiles, and warm welcomes to each trainload of troops. The townspeople served 6 million troops, and there were often up to 32 trainloads of soldiers a day. They used no state or federal funds; the food was supplied from North Platte and hundreds of other small Nebraska and Colorado towns.

Author Bob Greene went to North Platte to research the canteen registers and other old documents for his book. He contacted surviving canteen workers and troops, and from old memories and old documents, he captured the mood of the time. *Once Upon a Town: The Miracle of the North Platte Canteen* is more than a narrative of a heartwarming episode, it is a nostalgic look at a world that disappeared sometime during the 1960s and 1970s. Greene contrasts the past with the reality that is North Platte today. No passenger trains stop in North Platte, the depot has been gone for 30 years, and the fact that the largest railroad repair facility in the United States is still just outside the city is irrelevant to most townspeople.

Greene writes with sympathy and a well-developed ability to evoke an emotional response. The result is a small book that belongs on the growing pile of books that cry for a world

long lost, the world of what Tom Brokaw calls "The Greatest Generation." The book is worth reading because it offers a glimpse into why Middle America is now called "The Heartland."

**John H. Barnhill, Ph.D., Yukon, Oklahoma**

**RUSSIAN SUPPLY EFFORTS IN AMERICA DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR**, Dale C. Rielage, McFarland & Co. Inc., Publishers, Jefferson, NC, 2002, 164 pages, \$30.00.

Like other nations that fought in World War I, Russia was unprepared for the size, scope, and intensity of that conflict. Ammunition stocks disappeared as artillery fired projectiles far in excess of prewar projections. There were not enough supplies to meet the needs of the battlefield because the railroad lines were unable to deliver available supplies on time.

Russia, Britain, and France were not able to produce the materiel Russia needed in sufficient quantity. Dale C. Rielage ably tells the story of Russia's efforts to buy war supplies and railroad equipment from the United States and Canada. The story is not about efficiency and good acquisition practices; rather, it is about chaos, bureaucratic pigheadedness, ineffective management, and competing governments spending lots of money. Russia's representatives managed to get the materiel they needed delivered, but incompetence, infighting, and needless delay marked their efforts. This book looks at Russia's desperate efforts to supply its forces before revolution and civil war eventually consumed them. Many of the contracted supplies were delivered to White Russian forces in an effort to defeat the Bolsheviks.

Acquisition is critical to modern industrial war, so perhaps, a closer examination of the acquisition process should be included in one's military-history reading. Rielage's book makes a good start, but the book is not easy to read because of its nonstandard sentence construction, passive voice, and awkward phraseology. The reader must wade through several pages before picking up the author's pattern, and every sentence

must then still be read carefully in order to stay with the train of thought. Rielage also did not consult primary subject sources such as the Bakhmeteff Archives at Columbia University in New York or the Hoover Institution Library and Archives at Stanford University, California, which has over 260 linear feet of material from the Imperial and Provisional Russian Embassy.

The book does provide a good look at critical issues, and it highlights the way *not* to acquire military goods. Military historians, logisticians, and members of the Army Acquisition Corps in particular will find this book of interest.

LTC Lester W. Grau, USA, Retired,  
Leavenworth, Kansas

**SCOURGE OF THE SWASTIKA:**  
*A Short History of Nazi War Crimes*, Lord Russell of Liverpool, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, (1954), 2002, 384 pages, \$34.95.

**KNIGHTS OF BUSHIDO:**  
*A Short History of Japanese War Crimes*, Lord Russell of Liverpool, Cassell & Company, Ltd., London, (1958), 2002, Greenhill Books/Lionel Leventhal Limited, London, 352 pages, \$34.95.

Lord Russell uses his experience as a lawyer during the Nuremberg Trials to illuminate the abuses of the key Axis regimes of World War II. This pair of books serves as a stark reminder of the dangers of appeasement and pacifism in the face of a fanatical, ideological, and nondemocratic enemy. The Nazis and the Imperial Japanese promised to expand their power, and they broadcasted their virulent nationalist policies but were largely placated by Western democracies. Lord Russell highlights the cost of that tolerance.

In *Scourge of the Swastika: A Short History of Nazi War Crimes*, Lord Russell rises above the well-known abuses of the holocaust to highlight Nazi abuses on a broader and more savage scale. He documents the slow, deliberate erosion of German democracy during the Nazi's inexorable drive toward tyranny. He brings the Gestapo, the SS, and the Army into full view and exposes their willing roles in state-sponsored repression. He does not downplay the holocaust, Nazi abuses of enemy

prisoners of war (EPW), outrages on the high seas, repression of civilian populations, or the use of slave labor.

What Lord Russell does in exposing the full spectrum of Nazi abuse he does in spades when discussing Japanese abuses in *Knights of Bushido: A Short History of Japanese War Crimes*. Lord Russell begins his book with the Japanese holocaust—the Rape of Nanking. The less-known abuses of the Chinese by the Japanese are almost more striking and brutal than those of the Nazi's. The Imperial Army raped, shot, bayoneted, and exploited the conquered peoples of the Empire in direct opposition to the Geneva Convention. The torture the Japanese inflicted on U.S. and British EPWs was startling and not widely reported. The Japanese starved, humiliated, and abused their conquered subjects shamelessly.

These books are an indictment of uncompromising, fanatical, and utopian ideology. They are a warning to those who would fail to take proactive action against openly virulent dictatorial and warlike regimes. Fanatics proclaim their beliefs and their methods, and if given the chance, they will deliver.

LTC John Sutherland, USA,  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**THE PRECISION REVOLUTION:**  
*GPS and the Future of Aerial Warfare*, Michael Russell Rip and James M. Hasik, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2002, 448 pages, \$48.95.

In *The Precision Revolution: GPS and the Future of Aerial Warfare*, Michael Russell Rip and James M. Hasik explore the evolution, emergence, and dominance of Global Positioning System (GPS) technology in modern warfare. From the inception of using rudimentary precision weaponry during the Vietnam war to the contemporary employment of advanced navigational technology during ongoing military operations, Rip and Hasik offer their analysis of the revolution by targeting modern conflict.

Although steeped in technical detail, *The Precision Revolution* is not a work of single focus; it details the full spectrum of the effects real-

ized from advancements in GPS technology. While the capabilities of each GPS-based weapons system are examined in detail, the true worth of *The Precision Revolution* is measured in strategic and diplomatic terms. Precision technology has empowered a few nations with the ability to apply decisive force earlier, giving them the ability to influence diplomatic relations.

What is debatable is the authors' assertion that the marriage of precision navigation with modern weapons systems made possible such events as the 100-hour ground phase of the 1991 Persian Gulf war. While GPS technology certainly facilitates command and control, improves the accuracy of modern weapons, and integrates information flow, it does not in itself represent a revolution in military affairs. Rip and Hasik's point—that dominance of the electromagnetic spectrum is the first step to victory—represents the inherent strength and Achilles' heel of GPS-based systems.

*The Precision Revolution* is the first of three collaborative efforts from Rip, who presently holds a joint appointment at James Madison College, and the Department of Epidemiology at Michigan State University. Hasik is a former naval officer and management consultant to a number of commercial and government agencies. Together they meld their knowledge of geography, satellite navigation, and weapons systems technology into a readable blend of techno-thriller and futures analyses. The result, while often open to debate, is a well-researched and written exploration of the effects and potential of precision weaponry in modern warfare.

*The Precision Revolution* is an excellent representation of the techno-revolutionaries—those who characterize revolutions in military affairs as purely technical in nature. Nevertheless, Rip and Hasik present their arguments well, and their book is as much about the military application of GPS-based weapons systems as about their analysis of the revolutionary shift in warfare effected by this technology.

MAJ Steven Leonard, USA,  
Fort Campbell, Kentucky



**THE MISSION: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military**, Dana Priest, W.W. Norton & Co., NY, 2003, 429 pages, \$26.95.

*The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military* combines keen observations with an interesting writing style, but in the end, its conclusions are flawed. Dana Priest's basic thesis is that over the past decade the U.S. military has taken on a greater role in formulating and executing foreign policy in many of the world's troubled regions. The author argues that the military's four-star regional commanders have usurped the influence and authority of the State Department and local ambassadors. This, Priest argues, leads to poor policy execution: "Pimpily young soldiers, taught to seize airstrips, instead play mayor, detective, and social worker in a gung-ho but ill-fated attempt to rebuild a nation after the fighting stops."

The reality is that nation-building is never easy, and the military is no worse at it than civilian agencies, but Priest never analyzes the alternatives, seemingly unaware that during our Nation's history, the military did the lion's share of nation-building.

Priest is particularly critical of the U.S. military's role in the Balkans, but admits that the region was the "site of the worst mass murder in Europe since World War II and a symbol of the powerlessness of the UN and international organizations." Priest also seems to understand that for all of its flaws as a peacekeeping force, the U.S. Army is better than the alternative, which in most cases is a choice between anarchy or the UN.

Priest cites U.S. complaints about UN effectiveness in Kosovo: "No one but KFOR [Kosovo Force] will do a damn thing. . . ." Yet, Priest neither debates the characterization nor offers suggestions on how the mission could have been better performed, emphasizing instead the negative aspects of U.S. military presence everywhere, criticizing soldiers on the ground for errant comments and minor mistakes, chiding an Army major in Kosovo for not recognizing the Albanian flag, and deriding a Special Forces officer in Colombia for saying, "Hopefully, we will one day accompany them [Colombian

troops]. At least these guys drink beer and are Christians."

What does Priest suggest be done to change the course of bad policy? She is virtually silent about an alternative. *The Mission* is a flawed "first look" at the military's evolving role in the 21st century. As the lone superpower, the United States is still defining itself. For a more balanced book, readers will have to wait awhile.

**Dale Andrade, Senior Historian,  
Fort McNair, Virginia**

**THE INDIAN MUTINY, 1857**, Saul David, Penguin Books, London, 2002, 504 pages. No price available.

*The Indian Mutiny, 1857*, is about a unique period in Indian history, when India was ruled in multiple ways. Its army and its different units—some Indian and some British—were all under different regimes. Regional characteristics, religion, and caste systems prevailed. The government could be described as a hodgepodge.

Folklore has focused on the issue of ammunition as the cause of the Indians' problems. David provides extensive analysis, including such rumors that animal fat was being used to ease ammunition insertion into standard-issue weapons. David describes two issues about the ammunition: first, the Hindus and Muslims had a dislike for cartridges. This was known but never addressed. Second, men who had an eye for political power and position in the new Indian Army were using the cartridge issue to stir mutiny.

However, the problems were much more complex, ranging from complaints about pay, recruitment, and uncomfortable uniforms to problems involving the mixing of different castes and religions. Because these problems were not being addressed, stirrings toward rebellion were increasing.

The uprising began in the Meerut garrison and spread throughout other garrisons. British officers and, in some instances, their families were killed; armories were looted; and treasuries were sacked. Mobs from nearby towns joined in the looting. European and Christian Indians were slain, and others were simply sent

away. At times European elements withdrew into fortified positions and waited for relief; sometimes it came, sometimes it did not.

The unrest spread with the inflated belief that success was with the mutineers. Ignoring conditions negotiated by surrender, they massacred those who had surrendered their forts in exchange for freedom. Bloodshed became standard for both sides, and the British sought revenge.

The mutiny, a series of sieges, consisted of small unit actions and major battles. Artillery was the key in conducting these sieges; it also played a major role in confrontations involving units in open battle. But it was the skill of small units fighting under skillful leaders that prolonged the siege. Small units disrupted major assaults by hitting large units before the large units could amass their strength. And, it was small units that hit artillery and destroyed precious cannons.

The war ended in 1859, and the mutinous troops were tried and executed. Order returned to the ranks, and reforms began to eliminate the mutiny's aggravating causes. The ratio of British troops to Indian troops shifted, and more Indians moved into positions of command in their units. Despite such advances, there would be other incidents before India and Pakistan gained independence.

Although interesting, the book might be confusing to someone unfamiliar with India. However, the subject is one we do not often take time to study. Perhaps we should.

**Peter Charles Unsinger, Ph.D.,  
San Jose, California**

**GRANT**, Jean Edward Smith, Simon & Schuster, NY, 2001, 781 pages, \$35.00.

*Grant* by Jean Edward Smith could well be the best biography on the most underrated military leader in U.S. history. Smith asserts Ulysses S. Grant's greatness from the beginning by prefacing the book with an 1885 *Richmond Dispatch* quote: "He was so pervaded by greatness that he seemed not to be conscious that he was great."

Beginning with Grant's heritage, Smith lays the ancestral foundation

of Hiram Ulysses Grant, whose name was later changed through a series of misunderstandings during Grant's time at West Point. This is only one of many examples illustrative of the historical vignettes that tie together the life of the 18th President of the United States. Smith carefully highlights Grant's salient character points and influential experiences and intermixes an abundance of well-researched examples that place Grant's actions into relevant historical context.

However, Smith does not deify Grant. Rather he spends every effort to accurately portray Grant's life and to dispel disparaging rumors. For example, Smith contrasts Grant's early success as a logistician with his failure as a businessman.

Highly detailed maps and explanations contribute to the narrative of Grant's Civil War battles, and numerous references from personal letters offer more than enough supplemental context to understand the molding factors in Grant's life. *Grant* serves as a central reference and leaves the reader with a deep sense of Grant's personality and character. Any student of military history or leadership will treasure this book.

**MAJ Devin Swallow, USAF,  
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia**

**AMERICAN EMPIRE: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy,** Andrew J. Bacevich, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002, 320 pages, \$29.95.

*American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy* is a contemporary history of U.S. foreign and military policy since the end of the Cold War. Andrew Bacevich, a former Army officer and a Professor of International Relations at Boston University, is uniquely qualified to write a book about America's use of diplomacy and military force in pursuit of its interests in the international arena.

Although the book focuses on the years after the Cold War, one of Bacevich's central themes is that, for the entire 20th century, the U.S. foreign and military policy reflected much more continuity than it changed. U.S. statecraft consistently pursued the objective of an "open

and integrated international order based on the principles of democratic capitalism, with the United States as the ultimate guarantor of order and enforcer of norms."

*American Empire* offers military audiences a lucid account of military force in pursuit of policy from Somalia to Kosovo. More salient, however, are the chapters titled "Full Spectrum Dominance" and "The Rise of the Proconsuls," where Bacevich offers a cogent assessment of the state of civil-military relations. In "Full Spectrum Dominance," Bacevich argues how the U.S. military's continued preference for the big-war (conventional) paradigm of the Cold War era, and the heavy tanks that are inherent in such a paradigm, has impeded the military's ability to transform.

Bacevich's argument is a utopian paradox—a contradiction that on the one hand finds the U.S. Army an instrument of policy while on the other hand it focuses on a big-war paradigm. The U.S. military's exclusive cultural preference for a big-war paradigm and its resistance to change, either by the changing security environment or its political leaders, impeded Transformation and made the U.S. military a less-effective instrument to meet the international security environment during the 1990s.

The chapter on the rise of the proconsuls demonstrates how the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 invested tremendous power in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and regional commanders in chief (CINC). General Colin Powell's influence on Presidents George H.W. Bush's and William Clinton's administrations to use a post-Cold War force-reduction model was the first consequence of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Powell preempted such an effort by the civilian leadership and insisted on a close adherence to the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine. In deciding to use force, Powell tried to proscribe the use of force outside the conventional war paradigm.

The second consequence of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was the empowerment of the regional CINCs with resources at their disposal that far outweighed those of the Depart-

ment of State. Bacevich argues that by the end of the 1990s, the CINCs had become de facto regional proconsuls.

*American Empire* is a readable, current history of the use of U.S. diplomacy and military force in the decade after the Cold War, and its discussion of civil-military relations merits the attention of U.S. military officers. The book provides a clear account of how U.S. military forces were used in the 1990s; examines the continuity of President George W. Bush's foreign policy; and briefly recapitulates Operation Enduring Freedom. *American Empire's* only drawback is that its two-page conclusion is too short to adequately synthesize the discussions the main parts of the book present.

**MAJ Robert M. Cassidy, USA,  
Fort Hood, Texas**

**NO ONE LEFT BEHIND: The Lt. Comdr. Michael Scott Speicher Story,** Amy Waters Yarsinske, Dutton, NY, 2002, 292 pages, \$25.95.

Amy Waters Yarsinske deems the U.S. warrior's axiom "no one left behind" as outright fallacious. The circumstances surrounding the 17 January 1991 shootdown of naval aviator Lieutenant Commander Michael Scott Speicher's F/A-18 aircraft allows Yarsinske to contend that U.S. Government and military officials failed to exhaust all efforts to rescue and recover Speicher. The groundbreaking transition of Speicher's status from KIA-BNR (killed in action-body not recovered) to MIA (missing in action) in January 2001 bolsters the alternative scenario Yarsinske suggests.

Using interviews, E-mails, government documents, and case files from the Pentagon, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the U.S. Navy, Yarsinske concludes that Speicher was a victim of fratricide. The evidence cited suggests that Speicher safely ejected from his aircraft, survived, and was later captured by Saddam Hussein's forces. Yarsinske pinpoints Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Admiral Mike Boorda as key players in the case, arguing that bureaucratic redtape, interservice rivalries, and a lack of centralized military efforts impeded the analysis of

evidence. Yarsinske heralds the efforts of Speicher's VFA-181 squadron mates as the main force behind the reinvestigation and reclassification of Speicher as MIA.

Within the historiographic context of the Gulf War, *No One Left Behind* provides significant insight into issues of interservice rivalry, fratricide, and accountability, while highlighting problems in intelligence-gathering, photo-interpretation, and bureaucratic ineptness. Yarsinske's discussion of these issues merits close attention by those interested in the history of the Persian Gulf war.

Sean N. Kalic, *Kansas State University, Manhattan*

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**RAIDER: The True Story of the Legendary Soldier Who Performed More POW Raids than Any Other American in History**, Charles W. Sasser, St. Martin's Press, NY, 2002, 336 pages, \$6.99.

*Raider: The True Story of the Legendary Soldier Who Performed More POW Raids than Any Other American in History* is Charles W. Sasser's biography of Command Sergeant Major Galen Kittleson, whose military career spanned four decades, from World War II to the post-Vietnam army. He is credited with performing more raids to liberate prisoners of war (POWs) than any other U.S. soldier.

Kittleson grew up on a farm in northern Iowa during the Great Depression. Although small in stature, he made up for it with guts, hard work, and a deep faith in God. In 1943 he volunteered for service. His knack for soldiering was apparent in his basic training, where he volunteered for airborne school—the only volunteer in his company. After completing airborne training, Kittleson was assigned to the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment in the South Pacific.

Throughout his career, Kittleson was known for his quiet confidence. He was a man of few words, but he had a huge heart. A solid performer, he was the type of soldier that all small-unit leaders wanted in their outfits. His soldiering skills soon won him the position of "First Scout" of his unit. He became point man on patrols, and his skills while on point

saved patrols on several occasions. These skills were what led his platoon leader to volunteer Kittleson for service with the famed Alamo Scouts.

The 6th U.S. Army Special Reconnaissance Unit, better known as the Alamo Scouts, was a forerunner of modern-day U.S. Army Special Forces Operational Detachments—Alpha. The Alamo Scouts were the Sixth Army's long-range reconnaissance unit, which performed reconnaissance and surveillance missions, raids, and personal security details for General Douglas MacArthur. The Scouts also worked with the indigenous people of the South Pacific.

The Alamo Scouts' biggest mission was a joint raid, with U.S. Army Rangers and Filipino guerrillas, against the Japanese Army's prison camp at Cabanatuan in the Philippines. Cabanatuan was the wretched POW camp where the Japanese Army interred survivors of the Bataan Death March. The Alamo Scouts had previously raided a much smaller Japanese camp in New Guinea and had freed the Dutch Colonial Governor and about 65 others who were being held as slave laborers. Cabanatuan held over 500 American POWs. The camp, which was 25 miles behind Japanese lines, was garrisoned by 250 Japanese soldiers and was within minutes of 2,000 more.

The Alamo Scouts successfully liberated 516 survivors of the Bataan Death March, although one POW died of a heart attack during the raid and another during the exfiltration. The Scouts suffered only two wounded soldiers. Sasser recounts an incident where a British POW was left behind. He had dozed off in the latrine and slept through the raid. On awakening, he realized he was the only one left in the camp. With the help of a friendly Filipino, he soon made his way to freedom.

Kittleson returned to Iowa after the war, married, and went into farming. He stayed home during the Korean war, but in his heart he was still a soldier. In 1956, he reenlisted and was assigned to the 101st Airborne and later to the 10th, 6th, and 5th Special Forces Groups.

During the Vietnam war, Kittleson participated in two raids to liberate

U.S. POWs. In March 1968, as a master sergeant, a much older "Pappy" Kittleson led an unsuccessful attempt to find and liberate a fellow Special Forces officer, First Lieutenant Nick Rowe, who was being held by the Viet Cong.

Kittleson's fourth and final raid was the 1970 Son Tay Raid led by the famous special operator Colonel Arthur "Bull" Simons. This well-orchestrated raid took place in North Vietnam not far from Hanoi. Although American POWs had been relocated some weeks before the raid, there was still fierce fighting, demonstrating the resolve of the U.S. military to bring their fellow soldiers home.

*Raider* is easy to read and hard to put down. The chapters are short and full of well-placed, interesting dialogue, almost making the book a first-person account. I highly recommend it.

CPT Blake Stone, *USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*

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**AND KEEP MOVING ON: The Virginia Campaign, May-June 1864**, Mark Grimsely, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 2002, 283 pages, \$45.00.

Although not groundbreaking like his first book, *The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865* (Cambridge University Press, New York, 1997), Ohio State University Professor Mark Grimsley's new book, *And Keep Moving On: The Virginia Campaign, May-June 1864*, is a superb overview of the 1864 Overland Campaign.

Grimsley presents little new information, but he continues the recent trend of elevating Union General Ulysses S. Grant's reputation without lowering Confederate General Robert E. Lee's. In fact, Grimsley argues that rather than a campaign by Lee, the "master of maneuver," versus Grant, "the butcher," the two men were much more alike than many will admit. The reason being that both men were so alike in strategy, tactics, and temperament.

After the Civil War, Grant's reputation suffered. He was maligned as a butcher—a heartless commander who simply bludgeoned his way to

victory. Grimsley shows that this was not the case. The 1864 Overland Campaign was much more than simply launching frontal attacks between the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia. Grant saw the war in totality, ordering General Nathaniel Banks to drive for Mobile; General William Sherman to drive on Atlanta; General Benjamin Butler to threaten Richmond from the southeast; and General Franz Sigel to cut off Richmond's supply lines in the Shenandoah. Grant hoped to tie down Confederate forces so Union numerical strength could be effective somewhere, or everywhere. Only Sherman understood the "new war"; all of the other commanders failed or retreated after limited gains.

Grimsley shows Grant as continually trying to maneuver Lee into the open. Grant soon discovered, however, that he was not facing an average general. For the first time, Grant had met his equal.

By anticipating Grant's actions, Lee parried each of Grant's thrusts, forcing head-to-head confrontations. But, just as Grant could not catch Lee in the open, Lee could not wrest the initiative from Grant. Grant succeeded in tying Lee's army down and inflicting over 30,000 casualties. Unfortunately, to do this, Grant's army incurred over 50,000 casualties. These casualties destroyed both armies' offensive capabilities.

With the Union defeat at Cold Harbor, Grant lost his last chance to catch Lee in the open. Grant launched the ill-fated Petersburg Campaign, and just as at Vicksburg and Donelson, Grant maneuvered his enemy into a siege. At this point, assuming that President Abraham Lincoln would win a second term, Grant felt it was only a matter of time before the Army of Northern Virginia would fall. In this respect, Lee had met his match.

One of the problems with a history of the Overland Campaign is the sense one gets of a lack of completion. When all is said and done, neither side had an advantage, and the end of the war was no closer than at the outset. The reader wishes that after the armies suffered nearly 90,000 casualties there had been a

more definitive ending than a stalemate.

As an operational history, this book provides a good discussion about the bloodiest summer in U.S. history. Grimsley shows the awful tragedy of what can happen when two armies fight force-on-force instead of asymmetrically. While readers interested in the unit-by-unit and minute-by-minute detail should continue to read Gordon C. Rhea's works, Grimsley has produced one of the finest operational Civil War histories in recent memory.

**MAJ James Gates, USAF,  
Lake Ridge, Virginia**

#### **WORTH THE FIGHTING FOR:**

**A Memoir**, John McCain with Mark Salter, Random House Audio Books, NY, 2002, 5 CDs, 5 hours, \$25.95.

*Worth the Fighting For: A Memoir* is a continuation of Senator John McCain's best-selling memoir, *Faith of My Fathers: A Family Memoir* (Perennial, NY, 2000), which concluded in 1972 when McCain was released after 5-1/2 years as a prisoner of war in Vietnam. With the help of Mark Salter, McCain finishes his story, covering his journey from the U.S. Navy to his run for the presidency.

On McCain's return from Vietnam, he regains his health and resumes his naval career, commanding carrier pilots, and serving as the Navy's liaison to the U.S. Senate. He accompanied such Senatorial luminaries as John Tower, Henry M. "Scoop" Jackson, and Morris Udall, learning valuable lessons that would later serve him well. In 1986 McCain was elected to the U.S. Senate from the State of Arizona, inheriting the seat of another of his role models, Barry Goldwater.

During his time in public office, McCain saw acts of principle and acts of craven self-interest. He describes both extremes with his characteristic unflinching straight talk and humor. He writes that the "Keating Five" savings and loan scandal was the lowest point in his political career. He also describes his triumphant moments: his return to Vietnam and his efforts to normalize relations between the U.S. and Vietnamese governments; his fight for campaign fi-

nance reform; and his bid for the presidency in 2000.

Throughout his discussions, McCain is refreshingly candid, even admitting that he attempted to deceive the voters in South Carolina during his presidential campaign when he took an equivocal stance on the State's display of the Confederate flag, a position he later renounced. He also berates himself for speaking recklessly and letting his temper get the best of him.

McCain provides portraits of the mavericks who have inspired him—Ted Williams, Theodore Roosevelt, Billy Mitchell, and even Robert Jordan, Ernest Hemingway's protagonist in *For Whom the Bell Tolls* (Scribner's, New York, 1940). McCain says that these lives demonstrate the ideals of heroism and sacrifice, stoicism, and redemption, and why certain causes, despite the costs, are worth fighting for.

McCain quotes a conservative critic who wrote, "Politics is so personal for McCain. It's all a matter of honor and integrity. That's the sum total of his politics." To this assertion, McCain responds, "If that's the worst that can be said about my public career, I'll take it, with appreciation."

Regardless of whether or not you like McCain, this is a revealing, engaging book by a political insider who tells us a lot about the current political scene, although not much about McCain himself.

**LTC James H. Willbanks, USA,  
Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas**

**THE BEDFORD BOYS: One American Town's Ultimate D-Day Sacrifice**, Alex Kershaw, De Capo Press, Cambridge, MA, 2003, 240 pages, \$25.00.

*The Bedford Boys: One American Town's Ultimate D-Day Sacrifice* tells the story of Bedford, the Virginia town of 3,000 people, that lost 19 sons on Omaha Beach in the early morning hours of 6 June 1944. The soldiers were all members of Virginia National Guard Unit Company "A" of the 116th Infantry Regiment. No other town in America suffered greater proportional losses during the war.

Using interviews with survivors, family, and friends, Alex Kershaw

aptly chronicles the lives of the men and the events and that led to D-Day. Through Kershaw, we get to know Captain Taylor Fellers, the company commander, and each of the 38 men assigned to Company A. We see them as family and friends saw them so long ago.

D-Day forever changed Bedford; the town has never been the same. The effect of so many losses has cascaded down through the lives of wives, children, parents, siblings, fiancés, and friends, whose stories Kershaw also tells. In tribute to the fallen men and their town, President George W. Bush dedicated the National D-Day Memorial at Bedford, on 6 June 2001.

**MAJ William T. Bohne, USA,**  
*Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas*

**SOLDIERS: Fighting Men's Lives, 1901-2001,** Philip Ziegler, Penguin Group, NY, 2003, 331 pages, \$14.00.

Philip Ziegler, noted British biographer of Lord Mountbatten and King Edward VIII, turns his attention to other less notable, but nonetheless significant, British fighting men in *Soldiers: Fighting Men's Lives, 1901-2001*. Ziegler's elegant work deserves reflective consideration.

What does it mean to have been a soldier? Through the stories of nine men—engineers, artillerymen, infantrymen, and transporters—Ziegler reveals the transforming power and the long-lasting effect of military service. Bound by the common bond of service, these soldiers chose to live out their waning years in the Royal Hospital Chelsea, a British institution roughly analogous to the Army's Soldier's Home, where Ziegler interviewed the men.

*Soldiers* examines three recurring themes: who soldiers are, why they fight, and how they adjust to life following military service. In answering these questions, Ziegler indirectly traces dissolution of the British Empire. But he does not restrict himself to the men's military exploits. He details with personality and wit the maturity, adventure, and personal trials that came in equal portions with the men's journeys. Lapses in judgment receive equal treatment with heroic acts. One sees human foibles

and prejudices, but also the inculcation of values and standards that last a lifetime. Leadership and organizational lessons abound.

Ziegler contrasts British and U.S. soldiering. The soldiers who came in contact with U.S. forces during World War II expressed appreciation for the generosity extended to them, but most had reservations about the familiarity between U.S. ranks and the ever-present question of "who is in charge?" He leaves it to the reader to decide which system is better.

To his credit, Ziegler does not attempt to draw too many broad generalizations. He highlights the common points but makes allowances for variations. Readers who value a good story or who want to understand "the other ranks" will enjoy what *Soldiers* has to offer.

Ziegler's highly readable style carries the reader through the lives of Great Britain's "greatest generation." *Soldiers* is a worthwhile, engaging look at the depth to which military service touches those who serve.

**LTC Mike Stewart, USA,**  
*Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*

**THE TSAR'S LAST ARMADA: The Epic Voyage to the Battle of Tsushima,** Constantine Pleshakov, Basic Books, NY, 2002, 368 pages, \$30.00.

Much has been written about the Battle of Tsushima, which was one of the few decisive naval battles in history. Theorists Julian Corbett and A.T. Mahan have enshrined this battle for all time in their writings on naval theory and strategy, but Constantine Pleshakov describes an aspect of the fleet's voyage that has been little studied or celebrated—the logistical achievement of moving a coal-fired Baltic Fleet over 17,000 nautical miles to the Korean Peninsula to contest Japanese local command of the sea. Pleshakov's thesis is that the war, the Russian Navy, and even this battle are too little studied today. He argues that the lessons and insights to be gained from this parable deserve a broader audience.

The book reads much like a novel, having a fine narrative feel. Pleshakov paints the Russians, particularly the commander of the doomed fleet, as tragic heroes. To a degree Pleshakov depicts Admiral

Zinovy Petrovich Rozhdestvensky's accomplishment as a triumph of the will and a paean to commitment to duty—duty to a Czarist regime that clearly did not deserve such noble service. The Russian fleet's sacrifices and hardships are magnified by a disastrous battle that eventually destroys the Russian Fleet at the end of the epic voyage.

Pleshakov makes use of Russian language archival data and British archives. Of interest is his meticulous account of the intelligence and counterintelligence activity surrounding the deployment of the Baltic squadron. One shortcoming of the book is Pleshakov's tendency to include dubious personal facts about the protagonists, especially the Russians. On further investigation one often finds that this information comes not from primary sources but from secondary sources. Some details, such as the purported homosexuality of officers, provides lurid reading, but it detracts from the book as a serious military history and from Pleshakov's main argument. Still, I highly recommend this book for anyone interested in human nature, its nobility in adversity, and the dynamics of global maritime conflict.

**CDR John T. Kuehn, USN,**  
*Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*

**LEADERSHIP IN THE CRUCIBLE: The Korean War Battles of Twin Tunnels and Chipyong-ni,** Kenneth E. Hamburger, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, 2003, 256 pages, \$32.95.

Kenneth E. Hamburger takes an interesting approach in his exploration of leadership. He uses the story of the 23d Regimental Combat Team (RCT) and the French United Nations Infantry Battalion during the battles for the Twin Tunnels and Chipyong-ni in Korea as the backdrop for an analysis of various leaders. Hamburger's goals are to gain insight into how 23d RCT leaders acted, successfully or unsuccessfully, and to gain an understanding of the human factors that cause men to follow other men into combat.

Hamburger weaves personal accounts into his story to provide the reader a more personal feel, as in his description of a post-World War II regiment facing a deployment to

Korea. Although much has been written in general terms, Hamburger offers a more detailed personal view. The reader follows the regiment from Fort Lewis, Washington, to its initial baptism of fire on the Naktong River line, to the advancement into North Korea, to the withdrawal from North Korea, and finally, into the battles of the Twin Tunnels and Chipyeong-ni.

Hamburger focuses on two commanders: Colonel Paul Freeman, Commander of the 23d RCT, and Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Monclar, Commander of the French UN Infantry Battalion. Hamburger describes Freeman's background, his leadership style and philosophy, and interjects his leadership actions throughout the story. Freeman took command of the 23d Infantry right before the regiment deployed to Korea. He had a daunting task, but through his personal presence and calmness during the regiment's battles, he forged a cohesive fighting force that trusted and respected him.

Hamburger also mentions Freeman's disagreements with superiors and his controversial decision not to follow his division during the withdrawal from North Korea. Hamburger analyzes the dilemma of questioning orders and when commanders have the right and responsibility to do so.

Hamburger's analysis of Major General Ned Almond's controversial leadership is not flattering. Hamburger describes Almond's aggressiveness, his perceived racism as a World War II division commander, and his micromanagement of subordinate commanders. Hamburger discusses Colonel Marcel Crombez, Commander of the 5th Cavalry Regiment, and Lieutenant Colonel Edgar Treacy, Commander of the 3d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, in only one chapter, but the reader will find Hamburger's research worthy of reflection. Charged with relieving the encircled 23d RCT at Chipyeong-ni, Task Force Crombez fought its way through Chinese forces to reach the encircled men. During the attack, however, many of the accompanying infantrymen were abandoned, including the 3-5 commander.

This book's strength is in the description of the two battles, the relationship between the units in the 23d

RCT, and the relationship between the commanders. The book is also easy to read, and Hamburger mixes personal reflections with descriptions of unit action.

While having its shortcomings, the book does use the story of the 23d RCT to discuss leadership, and it contains instances when the reader will want more insight into the commanders and their decisionmaking processes. Although the book is not Freeman's biography, more of the insights and details of a biography would have enhanced this work.

I recommend this book because it offers the reader interesting analyses on leadership. Because there are so few books written about leadership at the organizational level, readers will find Hamburger's analysis interesting, thought-provoking, and worthy of discussion.

**LTC Robert Rielly, USA,  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**LITTLE PHIL: A Reassessment of the Civil War Leadership of General Philip H. Sheridan**, Eric J. Wittenberg, Brassey's Inc., Dulles, VA, 2002, 256 pages, \$24.95.

Eric J. Wittenberg states up front that Union General Philip H. Sheridan does not deserve the high praise he gets as being one of the Civil War's leading generals. The book sketches Sheridan's life and his military career prior to the Civil War; his command of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac; his personality traits, and his inability to tell the truth.

In his evaluation of Sheridan, Wittenberg uses his own experience as a trial lawyer and historian to analyze the conduct of battles and campaigns and official reports of Sheridan and his opponents. Wittenberg also states that in the Valley Campaign of 1864 Sheridan was "outgeneraled" by Confederate Lieutenant General Jubal Early.

Overall, Wittenberg portrays Sheridan as a petty, hypocritical, mendacious man whose primary focus was self-promotion. Of course Wittenberg does mention *some* of Sheridan's positive attributes. For example, Sheridan did have the ability to motivate soldiers, and by 1865 he showed a gift for commanding combined arms operations.

Readers will appreciate Wittenberg's candor.

**CH (LTC) Thomas C. Condry,  
USA, Fort Gillem, Georgia**

**ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORISM AND THE MIDDLE EAST: A Documentary Reader**, Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin, Oxford University Press, NY, 2002, 392 pages, \$30.00.

For the foreseeable future, the U.S. Army will be tied to radical Islamism as it wages war on fundamentalist terrorism and conducts major civil-military operations in two Islamic states. *Anti-American Terrorism and the Middle East: A Documentary Reader* provides an important reference for officers and other Army leaders working to understand the enemy.

The book begins with a short version of a 2001 article from the *Middle East Review of International Affairs* (Global Research in International Affairs Center, Herzliya, Israel) in which David Zeidan describes the anger and disillusionment that motivate the modern fundamentalist jihad. Zeidan's search to understand the motivations behind the violence comes from a perspective more critical of radical Islam than that of many intellectuals who unproductively tried to place blame with the United States in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks. This article is followed by firsthand discussions of Islamic fundamentalist tenets dating back to the 1940s, including writings by Hasan Al-Banna, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and Sheikh Muhammad Sayyad Tantawi.

Other chapters include information on the revolutionary movement, including charters of Hizballah and Hamas, and the tension between U.S. policy and the Islamic world, which provides a historical perspective on the issues. These chapters include writings by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter, and Saddam Hussein.

The book also focuses on writings that relate to the current war on terrorism. One chapter sites primary sources on Osama bin-Laden, including his 1996 declaration of war, personal interviews, excerpts from an al-Qaeda training manual, and Osama bin-Laden's speech in a recruiting video. Other chapters discuss pre-11

September 2001 al-Qaeda operations directed against the United States, the 11 September attacks, the Middle East reaction to those events, and a collection of U.S. Government statements (mostly speeches by President George W. Bush) on the war on terrorism.

The war on terrorism has expanded beyond al-Qaeda, Osama bin-Laden, and Afghanistan, so the final chapters might no longer be viewed as definitive or as comprehensive as they probably would have been when the book was first published. The 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States* and documentation of the events leading to and following the war with Iraq would be the next chapter in this collection, but at the time of publication, those documents were not yet available.

One other shortfall is the failure to include other fronts of the U.S. war on terrorism, such as in the Philippines, Yemen, and Iraq, or the status of anti-American terrorists in prospective trouble spots such as Iran, Syria, Pakistan, and the Sudan. The reader is challenged to determine the implications of the readings, as the book documents what has happened without providing much subtext to possible future alternatives. Still, the book is a valuable resource of primary writings that is interesting to read and useful as a source reference for U.S. Army leaders.

**CPT Matthew J. Morgan, USA,  
Schofield Barracks, Hawaii**

**WHEN WE WERE ONE: Stories of World War II**, W.C. Heinz, Da Capo Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002, 262 pages, \$23.00.

W.C. Heinz is one of the most versatile and acclaimed writers of our time. Perhaps overlooked in his storied career is the superb combat reporting and feature writing he produced during World War II. *When We Were One: Stories of World War II* is a collection of smaller pieces Heinz wrote during the latter stages of World War II and some longer magazine articles he wrote after the war.

Each piece highlights Heinz's ability to put the reader into the middle of the action and captures the emotions exuded on the battlefield. Al-

though the collection is filled with outstanding examples of Heinz's writing, two are particularly stirring. In "The Morning They Shot the Spies," Heinz discusses his emotions as he witnesses the execution of three German spies. In "Dawson Holds Line Above Aachen," he recalls a company commander emotionally breaking down while discussing his soldiers' heroism against the Germans.

Books such as *When We Were One* remind us that wars are fought by humans. We must never forget the most important dimension of warfare—the human dimension.

**LTC Rick Baillegeon, USA,  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: Master of the Senate**, Robert A. Caro, Random House Audio, NY, 2002, 9 hours, 6 cassettes, abridged, \$48.95.

*The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Master of the Senate* is the engrossing story about Johnson's early life and career. This is number three of a projected four-volume series that studies Johnson's life, beginning with his birth and continuing to his early political career as a congressional aide, progressing through his years as a congressman from Texas, and continuing through his presidency, and then to his death in 1973.

While still in his first term, Johnson became one of the most powerful leaders in the history of the U.S. Senate. He was always something of a professional "son," playing up to powerful, lonely men who were looking for proteges. Caro calls these men Johnson's three "R's": President Franklin D. Roosevelt; Speaker of the House of Representatives Sam Rayburn; and Georgia Senator Richard Russell. Roosevelt and Rayburn were key figures in volume one of the series. The key figure in volume three, aside from Johnson, is his mentor, Russell.

Russell was a brilliant man, extremely well read, dedicated, and almost deified by colleagues who, for his mastery of politics, called him the "greatest southern general since Robert E. Lee." Tragically, like Lee, he got on the wrong side of history; that is, obstruction of racial equality.

In 1952, Russell tried, but failed, to

get the Democratic Party's nomination for president, hoping to turn his party back to states' rights principles and restore the south to national leadership. After failing, he supported the ascent of Johnson, who he thought was going to carry on his efforts. Johnson had his own agenda, however, which he kept secret from Russell. This volume ends with Johnson engineering the first civil rights legislation to be passed by Congress since 1870—hardly what Russell had in mind.

Caro makes clear that the topic of this volume is legislative power, not power in the executive branch, which will apparently be the subject of prospective volume number four. Hopefully, Caro will clear up the question so often asked about Johnson, "How could a man so effective in the legislature do so poorly as commander in chief during the Vietnam war?"

**Michael Pearlman, Ph.D.,  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**JIHAD, The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia**, Ahmed Rashid, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 272 pages, 2002, \$24.00.

Ahmed Rashid's books are always good references of counterterrorism and Islamic militancy for Near East Asia experts. *Jihad, The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia* delves into religious radicalism in the former Soviet Central Asian Republics.

With the Soviet Union's collapse came newfound freedoms in the former republics of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. Ironically, these republics fought Gorbachev-era reforms and feared that disintegration of the Soviet Union meant economic ruin and political legitimacy erosion for the loyal apparatchiks who ruled the region for Moscow. Rashid discusses the vacuum left behind after the Soviet Union's fall, which included not only economic, but also the rediscovery of social and religious values that had been suppressed under communism.

Before Soviet domination, Central Asia Muslims followed a more liberal form of Sufi Islam. The Turkmen Basmachis challenged Soviet authority and led Joseph Stalin to redraw the map of Central Asia to make this

rebellion more manageable. The Basmachis' form of Islam was driven underground. Many did not understand Arabic and knew little of Islam, yet they were thirsty for information about their identity. Saudi Wahabis filled this religious void and began to erode the more tribal and liberal Sufi interpretations. In its place came the Wahabi-brand of strict observance and intolerance that spawned religious militancy in the region.

Several former communist leaders used symbolism, religion, and outright dictatorial tactics to remain in power. Rashid takes the reader through each Central Asia republic, discussing corruption, economic mismanagement, and outright megalomania, conditions in which Islamic militancy thrived and which led to the creation of several Islamist groups.

The Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) in Tajikistan, engaged in a civil war between 1992 and 1999. Several IRP leaders had seen the benefits of working with the government to bring about change. The question then became: "Would it be one election, one vote, one time, meaning once in power, would they eliminate all opposition or would they accept eventual democratic defeat gracefully?"

Hizb-ul-Tahrir is an underground movement with a unique mandate to restore the Caliphate and unify all Muslims in Central Asia and from there the entire world. They are the most vocal and have their own website.

Hizb-ul-Tahrir was originally founded by two Palestinians, but has since found a home in Central Asia. Rashid discusses the Uzbekistan Islamic Movement (IMU) and its leader Juma Namangani. What made the IMU unique was its close association with al-Qaeda and its fighting alongside the Taliban against U.S. and Northern Alliance troops. The IMU supporters received extensive combat training in coordinated armored assaults, heliborne tactics, and combined infantry assaults from Taliban and al-Qaeda trainers and gained combat experience against Taliban enemies.

Rashid's book is a must for anyone interested in Operation Enduring

Freedom, foreign area officers, and intelligence personnel. They will find this book a valuable guide.

**LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, USN,**  
*Gaithersburg, Maryland*

**THE WAR WITH JAPAN: The Period of Balance May 1942-October 1943**, H.P. Willmott, Scholarly Resources Inc., Wilmington, DE, 2002, 180 pages, \$60.00.

This is the first in a planned series of books called *Total War: New Perspectives on World War II*, whose purpose is to provide brief, accessible, affordable, and tightly focused studies on the vital aspects of World War II.

December 1941 to May 1942, a period of one success after another for the Japanese Empire, was a time of one incredible defeat after another for the Allies. However, the June 1942 battles on the Coral Sea and on Midway Island represented the first campaign battles for which the Japanese had not planned before the outbreak of war. Willmott contends that the Japanese, having achieved their pre-war objectives in stunning fashion, were at a strategic impasse. The Allies, having taken stunning losses, were also in a quandary as to what strategy to employ. Willmott uses the analogy of the strategic initiative in May-June 1942 to a gun lying in the street, available to either side to pick up and use.

Examining the campaigns in the Solomons and New Guinea and the battles for Guadalcanal, Coral Sea, and Midway, Willmott argues that the Imperial Navy and the U.S. Navy fought each other to exhaustion. However, strategic decisions made after the battle of Midway, and the U.S. Navy's ability to rebuild and carry the fight to Japan, meant that the United States and its Allies could seize the strategic initiative by "picking up the gun" and never relinquishing it. Willmott's opinion is that this period of balance was the critical time when either side "could make the move that would ultimately win or lose the war."

Because *The War with Japan: The Period of Balance May 1942-October 1943*, is "tightly focused," serious students will not find an exhaustive study of the war with Japan,

nor will they find a complete study of this particular period of the war. Readers might find the book lacking in depth and, perhaps, a bit stilted. Given the book's purpose, however, Willmott adequately presents and supports his thesis. If the other books in the series are of similar quality, they will greatly add to the study of the war.

**LTC David G. Rathgeber, USA,**  
*Retired, Camp Pendleton, California*

**THE COMMANDERS**, Bob Woodward, Touchstone Books (Simon & Schuster), New York, (1991) 2002, 398 pages, \$16.00.

Bob Woodward's best-selling account of decisionmaking within the inner sanctum of U.S. leadership is revisited for a new generation in this trade paperback. A long-time favorite for military professionals, *The Commanders* is a modern classic that offers readers a rare glimpse into the workings of the National Command Authority during Operation Just Cause and the months preceding the Persian Gulf war. As only he can, Woodward lays bare decisions, recounts private conversations, and closely examines personalities. The result is a book that is as fascinating to read as it is difficult to put down—a primer for decision analysis within President George H.W. Bush's administration.

Now, more than 10 years after the events that drove Woodward to pursue the more than 400 personal interviews that comprise *The Commanders*, the book could not be more relevant. As America further embarks in the war on terrorism, many of the same personalities remain at the nexus of the decisionmaking apparatus. Two vital players of those decade-old events, current Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of State Colin Powell, continue to formulate policy and influence decisions at the core of efforts to destroy al-Qaeda and other entities that threaten U.S. interests.

Woodward, the *Washington Post* investigative reporter who played a central role in documenting the Watergate scandal and the fall of President Richard M. Nixon's administration, essentially credits Cheney and Powell, and combat commanders



Generals Maxwell Thurman and Norman Schwarzkopf, with providing the critical focus necessary to execute war. Though Woodward rarely mentions Cheney in an openly positive manner, he nonetheless portrays him as an instinctively progressive leader who offers no quarter to those clearly “not on the administration team.” Conversely, Woodward recognizes Powell as a natural leader—measured and politically savvy. Within the book’s pages, readers will clearly see two men destined for leading roles in the Nation’s future.

Critics of *The Commanders* and Woodward’s style are not difficult to find. Woodward chooses not to attribute quotes or thoughts to any source, a method that irks historians and political scholars. His writing tempo is fast-paced, authoritative, and informative; readers are left to interpret events without a clearly defined perspective or reference. Woodward’s historical journalism method is neither purely historical nor journalistic, but a careful merging of the two disciplines.

*The Commanders* remains a valuable addition to the professional bookshelf. No military leader should pass the opportunity to review Woodward’s historical account of wartime decisionmaking in the first Bush White House. This book should be one of the first volumes introduced into any professional reading program as America continues to fight an elusive, complex enemy.

**MAJ Steven Leonard, USA,  
Fort Campbell, Kentucky**

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**SANTA ANNA: A Curse Upon Mexico**, Robert L. Scheina, Brassey’s Inc., Washington, DC, 2002, 116 pages, \$19.95.

Everybody knows about Santa Anna, the villain of the Alamo who lost the Mexican War. Texans know about the roads to Goliad and to San Jacinto—the story that is told in U.S. history books. But Mexican history books tell a different story. They describe how Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna got to San Antonio, how he managed to become obscenely rich in such a pathetically poor country, even after his repeated debacles as a military leader, and how he surrendered one-third of his country to

the United States. Amid all this, he managed to be elected president 11 times. While Santa Anna’s is quite a story, it has not been told in quite this way.

Because of mercantilism and racism, Santa Anna’s Mexico—a country stagnant for 300 years—was ripe for revolution. When in the early 1800s the exploited native-born Spanish and Indians revolted, Mexican-born Santa Anna opportunely fought on the winning side.

Santa Anna’s career began in 1810 and by 1822 he was a general. In politically unstable Mexico, conditions were right for military men willing to take what they wanted, when they wanted it, and without fear of reprisal. By 1845 Santa Anna owned a 483,000-acre ranch, where he raised 40,000 head of cattle. He had brass, boldness, enthusiasm, and a lot of luck. However, his judgment was shaky, and his military adventures were more narrow escape than triumph. By the 1860s, Santa Anna was old, exiled, and obsolete; amnestied in 1874, he died in Mexico in 1876, poor and senile.

This highly condensed biography allows little room for analysis. Some of Santa Anna’s just-in-time switches of allegiance seem almost miraculous; and, with the absence of background information, they are inexplicable.

*Santa Anna, A Curse on Mexico* does not pretend to break new scholarly ground or offer new insights and revelations; it is simply a short, condensed version of Santa Anna’s biography. For an extended biography, readers must look elsewhere.

**John H. Barnhill, Ph.D.,  
Yukon, Oklahoma**

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**A MILITARY HISTORY OF CHINA**, David A. Graff and Robin Higham, eds., Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 2002, 316 pages, \$31.00.

*A Military History of China* is the first book in a Western language that describes the role of force and military institutions in modern Chinese military history in anything approaching a satisfactory form. Written for non-specialists, the book is organized into an introduction and 15 discrete essays. Five of the essays are thematic and deal with subjects like state-making and state-breaking;

the Chinese Northern Frontier problem; naval operations; military writings; and continuities and discontinuities. There is a brief survey of the Qing Empire, but the editors devoted most of the book to essays on narrowly drawn Chinese military history topics written since 1850.

Many of the topics are well known to modern Chinese history specialists, but they are undeservedly obscure to the general reader. For example, Maochun Yu’s succinct essay on the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864) outlines the causes of the titanic civil war (approximately 25 million people died) and gives a pithy campaign history in which he explains the reasons for Qing success and Taiping failure. In addition, he summarizes the best of the literature in English and gives some indication of the lacunae that remain in Taiping studies. Edward McCord’s essay on warlordism follows a similar outline, succinct explanation, and a brief operational history and reasons for rise and decline. McCord presents the ablest summary of the phenomenon and when placed in context tells one much about the course of contemporary Chinese politics and the reasons for Chinese fears of “disorder.”

Essays on the Sino-Japanese War and on Mao Tse-tung as a military leader, are similarly illuminating. William Wei, who has written about Chiang Kai-shek’s 5th Bandit Extermination Campaign, uses his knowledge to make a realistic assessment of Mao Tse-tung as a soldier and a military theoretician. After peeling back the layers of myth, he finds Mao Tse-tung had mastered the organizational and political side of warfare but would have been lost had it not been for Zhu De. In a similar vein, Stephen MacKinnon writes about the Chinese Army’s 1938 fight against the Japanese in the middle Yangtze around Hankou. He uses this brief case study to illuminate Chinese strategy and to show how the ferocity of the campaign figured in the further course of the war.

An essay about recent Chinese conflicts, by Larry Wortzel, and another about the contemporary People’s Liberation Army, (PLA), by Jane Teufel Dreyer, ably dissect their subjects. Wortzel’s conclusion—that

China uses force or the threat of force as part of its diplomacy—is a particularly well-researched essay. While not reaching any startling conclusions, he gives the reader a summary of China's recent armed conflicts. Dreyer, on the other hand, concentrates on the PLA as it is today. She finds that great gaps exist between intentions and abilities and between plans and reality but ably explains why this is so.

This collection is well done and anyone with a professional interest in China and the Chinese military should read these essays.

Lewis Bernstein, Ph.D.,  
Huntsville, Alabama

**THE NAZI GERMANY SOURCE-BOOK: An Anthology of Texts,** Roderick Stackleberg and Sally A. Winkle, Routledge, New York, 2002, 455 pages, \$27.95.

No single-source reference for the student of Nazi Germany's rise and fall is better than *The Nazi Germany Sourcebook*, which is full of documents that chronicle the Nazi ascension to power; the state's consolidation and seizure; the conduct of the war; the implementation of the holocaust; the Nazi's decline; and their eventual fall. Official papers and private correspondence bring the Nazi saga to life. Personal letters and internal memos, often chilling, illustrate the mentality and perspectives of the perpetrators as well as the victims. They document the populist, nationalist erosion of civil rights and the hypnotic power of National Socialism in post-World War I Germany.

The authors, presenting over 140 documents spanning 150 years to illuminate Adolf Hitler's rise to power, include minutes from meetings, legislative decrees, speeches, manifestos, and diplomatic letters. Few sources are more exhaustive, comprehensive, or more illuminating than the ones Roderick Stackleberg and Sally A. Winkle have amassed. To add to the body of information, the authors preceded each major document with an incisive analysis, which are indispensable additions to the book. The analyses cut through the defensive and obscure language of incriminating verbiage to expose real intent.

If the reader wants to study the phenomenon of creeping dictatorship, civil-rights erosion, and the radicalization of a nation, *The Nazi Germany Sourcebook* is a great source. The book is extensive and comprehensive; a good research source; and is a natural companion to William L. Shirer's *Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1991).

The book is a natural addition to any World War II history library; it is fascinating, enigmatic reading.

LTC John R. Sutherland, USA,  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**THE HIGH COST OF PEACE: How Washington's Middle East Policy Left America Vulnerable to Terrorism,** Yossef Bodansky, Prima Publishing, Roseville, CA, 2002, 652 pages, \$27.95.

Can there be peace in the Middle East? No, according to Yossef Bodansky in his book on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process from 1998 to July 2002. *The High Cost of Peace* shows two vastly different definitions of peace that prevent any true peace between Israel and Yassir Arafat's Palestinian forces.

Supposedly for Arafat, peace is a process to gain territory to replace Israel with a Palestinian state and return displaced Palestinians. According to Bodansky, Arafat will say anything or sign almost anything to gain land for his war of independence, but he does not always honor his word nor end the violence.

Bodansky presumes that for Israel, peace means an end to Palestinian violence; that Israel will return land if it means an end to terrorism. But if terrorism continues, he feels, eventually there will be a public demand for a military crackdown. For Israel to give territory to an enemy to use for violence against them would be suicide. Therefore, Israel's response to terror can be viewed as self-defense.

Both Israel and Egypt receive pressure from outside influences. Bodansky maintains that the United States supports its democratic Jewish ally, but that U.S. presidents also use this support to try to divert attention away from U.S. domestic affairs and to build a "legacy." In turn, Arab states support Palestinian strikes against non-Arab powers.

Bodansky explains the complicated international politics that influence the peace process and describes the motives of the nations that play roles in the process, including China and Vietnam's support of the Palestinians and Arabs.

The book's details are exceptional, with information from many sources, including data seemingly from Israeli intelligence. However, in other areas the book lacks background data; it would help to have more information on Osama bin-Laden and his role and goals in promoting violence in Israel. An explanation of the differences in the political parties in Israel would also help readers. The failure to give some details might be because Bodansky assumes his readers know more than they do. He has written a book on Osama bin-Laden and has many articles available on the Internet, usually at pro-Israel web sites.

Bodansky fails to attribute some facts to specific sources, instead mentioning anonymous sources, which makes him a suspect as a vehicle through which Israel can release information on Arafat and Palestinian terrorists. Despite being pro-Israel, however, Bodansky's work is still valuable. The book answers many questions on the peace process, and should interest anyone wanting to learn more about that conflict's recent history.

MAJ Herman Reinhold, USAF,  
Yokota Air Base, Japan

**POLITICAL ARMIES: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy,** Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, eds., Zed Books, New York, 2002, 398 pages, \$29.95.

In the post-Cold War period, a perception has emerged that the rise of democracy in the world signals a decline in military governments and dictators. Political armies, or armies that take an active role in the government of a nation, have often claimed the nation's sovereignty as a sacred trust. Throughout the world, however, even the most well-intentioned nation-building strategies of a political army will come into conflict with the needs and rights of the people. Too often, the conflict is exacerbated to the point of violence

and human rights abuses.

While a commitment to democracy is winning the minds of most Western and many Northern peoples, including military professionals, the conversion is far from complete. Editors Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt have assembled an international group of scholars to write a series of country studies addressing the status of various political armies around the world today. The book is enlightening and thought provoking for the military reader; however, it is no Sunday-afternoon read.

The Latin American-style political armies of the Cold War era are largely going the way of General Augusto Pinochet. In countries with radical Islamists or a long history of entrenched violence and oppression, particularly in Africa, political armies are on the rise.

Military readers might balk at the liberal academic generalizations about militaries and military culture. Worldwide, the social juxtaposition and technological complexity of illiteracy is often interwoven with corruption, incompetence, and outright despotism in the government. This contributes to a pattern where the unattended needs of a disenfranchised population polarize society, erode the state, and even threaten the nation. The book's brief discussions of how political Islam is using secular democracy against itself are fascinating and frightening.

**CW2 Steven M. Bradley, USA,**  
*Fort Lewis, Washington*

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**SHADOWS OF BLUE & GRAY: The Civil War Writings of Ambrose Bierce,** Brian M. Thomsen, ed., A Tom Doherty Associate Book, New York, 2002, 284 pages, \$24.95.

Ambrose Bierce has been called a journalist, a short-story writer, a literary critic, and a curmudgeon. However, his 35 firsthand Civil War accounts in *Shadows of Blue and Gray: The Civil War Writings of Ambrose Bierce*, provide the reader an interesting view into his personal thoughts on the horrors of America's first modern war.

Bierce's stories represent a variety of genres that include straight news reporting and storytelling; some stories even border on the supernatural. The reader also gets a close look at the ordinary soldiers who fought in the Civil War.

The story of Private Carter Druse, a Union picket, is particularly poignant. Falling asleep at his post, he awakens to find a Confederate officer on horseback in front of his concealed position. Taking care to aim his rifle he knew that "the duty of the soldier was plain: the man must be shot dead from ambush—without warning, without a moment's spiritual preparation, with never so much as an unspoken prayer, he must be sent to his account. In his memory, as he prepared to fire his weapon, Druse recalled [his] father's words as they parted months earlier, 'whatever may occur, do what you conceive to be your duty.'" As Druse fires his rifle, the Confederate officer falls from his horse. The officer turns out to be Druse's father. Bierce's work is filled with small stories such as this one that will keep the reader's attention from beginning to end.

**MAJ Michael E. Long, USAR,**  
*Retired, New Port Richey, Florida*

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**BLOOD IMAGE: Turner Ashby in the Civil War and the Southern Mind,** Paul Christopher Anderson, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 2002, 258 pages, \$34.95.

Brigadier General Turner Ashby, Stonewall Jackson's daring cavalry commander, was a savage partisan leader and a chivalrous conventional cavalryman. Paul Christopher Anderson's book is about the dichotomies in Ashby's life and image.

Ashby was the son of an old Virginia family that had fallen on hard times. Despite having no formal military education, Ashby rose to prominence during a militia response to John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry in 1859. When the Civil War began, Ashby and his brother joined a cavalry unit along the Virginia-Maryland border. Ashby's brother was killed in an ambush. After that, Ashby's service vacillated between two extremes: the chivalrous cavalier and the savage partisan.

Anderson's book is not a biography in the strictest sense, as it is narrative, not chronological, and the narrative mixes the order of events, making their exact flow difficult to follow. Anderson's presentation is rather esoteric. Despite reading like a doctoral dissertation, the book presents a complicated story about a

complex man and fully captures the man's essence and image.

**LTC D. Jonathan White, USA,**  
*Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*

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**A HISTORY OF MODERN WARS OF ATTRITION,** Carter Malkasian, Praeger Publishing, Westport, CT, 2002, 240 pages, \$64.95.

This expensive book, which adds little to our understanding of attrition as an emergent strategy, might be of some value if the reader cares to investigate historical examples of field commanders who have selected this strategy. However, anyone interested in a national policy of attrition versus annihilation, or in strategies that have emerged from combat give-and-take, will find little value in this work. Carter Malkasian assesses several famous military commanders' declarations but, generally, assumes that these commanders actually did what they said they did and that they had nearly absolute freedom of choice. This system of analysis might be too simple to add much to our understanding of the creation of military strategies in a political context.

Malkasian examines three case studies that he believes demonstrate commander-selected use of attrition as a deliberate strategy. These cases—Buna, Burma, and Korea—serve to illustrate attrition over the entire course of military history from 1792 to the present. His analyses of these three case studies contain little in terms of context of these campaigns within the larger framework of their wars; fail to assess the influence of culture, industrial strength, and political requirements; and in general, are not compelling assessments of the use of attrition.

Although Malkasian's claim that attrition has effectively served to win campaigns, these three case studies fail to substantiate his assertions. His is a seriously flawed work of little merit for anyone seriously studying the development of military strategy.

**Peter J. Schifferle, Ph.D.,**  
*Lansing, Kansas*

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**THIRD REICH VICTORIOUS: The Alternate History of how the Germans Won the War,** Peter G. Tsouras, ed., Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2002, 256 pages, \$34.95.

Professional historians and war buffs alike have long debated the "what ifs" of history. Many recent

books on the subject are written by experts with a sound understanding of the circumstances involved in pivotal roads taken and not taken. *Third Reich Victorious: The Alternate Decisions of World War II*, edited by Peter G. Tsouras, adds much to the exploration of these inventions with its enjoyable insight into the possibilities of a "different" Second World War in Europe.

In each of the chapters, historians look at various points in the course of World War II and determine when events could have progressed quite differently. Each well-written chapter combines fascinating debate with genuine plausibility. Only in rare cases do the prerequisites for a different course of action become strained. Even in these cases though, the authors reasonably present their arguments. The best example of this is in the final chapter where Tsouras examines a possible scenario of an Eastern Front stalemate after Germany's shattering defeats there in the summer of 1944.

Many common themes run through the chapters, although there is no structural link between any of them. For example, a number of the scenarios involve Lord Halifax's rise to power in England rather than the more bellicose Winston Churchill following Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's demise. Adolf Hitler's activities and decisions figure prominently as well, whether from a chance meeting with a new mentor in the immediate post-World War I years or from his death in a successful assassination attempt toward the war's end.

Tsouras's contributors are dedicated and knowledgeable, and the end result is quite satisfying. For readers who enjoy studying alternate history possibilities, *Third Reich Victorious* will not disappoint.

**MAJ Michael A. Boden, USA,  
Hohenfels, Germany**

**THE FALL OF BERLIN, 1945,**  
Antony Beevor, Viking Press, New York,  
2002, 490 pages, \$29.95.

Good stories bear retelling, and this is certainly the case with the story of dramatic battles recounted by expert storytellers. Both conditions are met in Antony Beevor's new book, *The Fall of Berlin, 1945*.

Few battles have more inherent drama than the titanic struggle for the

capital of the Third Reich in the last days of World War II. Beyond that, few current authors can match Beevor's skill in battle narrative. His sure grasp of the broad sweep of military operations and the countless human tragedies involved make this a highly readable account of Nazi Germany's cataclysmic end.

Beevor's ability to create an exciting account of a great battle comes as no surprise. His previous book, *Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege, 1942-1943* (Penguin USA, New York, 1999) won awards and critical acclaim and demonstrated his ability to exploit German and Soviet sources in reconstructing the drama of the epoch battles between the empires of Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin.

As a former officer of the British Army's 11th Hussars, Beevor understands the internal logic of modern armies and the fog and friction that befuddle armies on the battlefield. His sympathy for the officers and men of both sides caught up in the desperate fighting in places like the Seelow Heights and the Reichstag's ruins is apparent throughout the book. Yet, he also gives ample space to the plight of civilians trapped in the relentless tide of suffering and the destruction that accompanied the end of the Nazi regime.

Beevor goes to great lengths to describe the Battle of Berlin within a broader framework of events that occurred at the end of World War II in Europe. He recounts Stalin's desperate desire to reach the Nazi capital ahead of the Western Allies and then shows how the Soviet dictator fulfilled this desire by fomenting competition between Georgi K. Zhukov and Ivan Konev, the two front commanders assigned the mission of capturing the German capital.

Beevor also considers the debate among the Western Allies as the cynical British statesman, Winston Churchill, urged the naïve American general, Dwight D. Eisenhower, to join the race to the German capital. (Beevor shows his British prejudice at this point.) Thus, despite the title, the scope of Beevor's book goes well beyond the fighting that occurred within the Nazi capital.

By reviewing the evidence in Soviet archives, Beevor ties up some loose ends as well. Martin Bormann has long been considered the high-

est-ranking Nazi to escape the *Gottterdammerung*. Beevor weighs the evidence and concludes that Bormann, Hitler's right-hand man, died in the streets of Berlin during a failed attempt to break through Soviet lines shortly after Hitler's suicide. The fate of Hitler's remains also has long been a mystery. Beevor believes the Soviets flushed the Fuehrer's ashes into the sewer system of Magdeburg in 1970, and that they stored Hitler's skull and jawbone in secret Russian archives.

In the spring of 2003, when coalition forces began their race to Baghdad, pundits and armchair generals warned that the goal of regime change was likely to require a bloody, urban battle in the streets of the Iraqi capital. Beevor shows us what regime change looks like when it is accompanied by bitter house-to-house fighting; it is not a pretty picture.

The Soviets used 2-1/2 million troops to storm Hitler's capital and took an estimated 300 thousand casualties in the process. The city's inhabitants' suffering, caused by the fighting and the epidemic of rape and looting that accompanied Berlin's capture, defy human accounting.

*The Fall of Berlin, 1945*, is not a scholarly account of military operations. For that, a military professional or military scholar will do better to consult the impressive work of another Englishman, Anthony Le Tissier. Nevertheless, both the scholar and the casual reader will find themselves informed and entertained by Beevor's book.

**LTC Scott Stephenson, USA,  
Retired, Lansing, Kansas**

**SUCCESS IS ALL THAT WAS  
EXPECTED: The South Atlantic  
Blockading Squadron During the  
Civil War,** Robert M. Browning, Jr.,  
Brassey's Inc., Washington, DC, 2002,  
495 pages, \$34.95.

In *Success is All That Was Expected*, Robert M. Browning, Jr., the Coast Guard's chief historian, has completed his study of the Union's blockading squadrons. The study began with *From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron During the Civil War* (University of Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa, 1993). In this new volume, Browning discusses the key

role the Union Navy played in cutting off supplies for the Confederacy. Interestingly, he spends much of his time not in deep water but, rather, on the coasts, particularly around Charleston and Savannah. He eloquently demonstrates problems caused by the lack of a unified command, showing how the Union Army and Navy had vastly differing strategic designs and how a lack of cooperation and central control severely impeded the blockading squadron's success. Numerous at-

tempts at capturing Charleston failed for these reasons, and Charleston fell only when Union General William Tecumseh Sherman's legions made its retention untenable.

Monitors were produced at the height of the Civil War, and over protests from commanders, the Navy Department continued the use of monitors to capture coastal cities. The monitors' failures played a key element in the South's retaining ports for blockade-runners.

Instead of emphasizing close

coastal operations, Browning might have provided a better balance if he had spent more time discussing blue water, demonstrated successes, and the challenges Navy captains faced in stopping fast blockade-runners. Nevertheless, this is an often overlooked aspect of Civil War operations. The lessons Admirals Samuel DuPont and John A. Dahlgren learned in the Atlantic 140 years ago are still useful to planners today.

**COL James Dunphy, USAR,**  
*Fairfax, Virginia*

## MR Letters

### The Woman Soldier

BRIG N.B. Grant, *AVSM, Retired, Pune, India*—In the March-April 2003 issue of *Military Review*, are letters from Hillel Adler, Israel; Robert Kingsbury, New Hampshire; and Colonel Cecil Currey, Florida, commenting on the "Women in Combat" articles that appeared in the November-December 2002 issue of *Military Review*. I am surprised that after two decades, the American public still has qualms about women in the military. Perhaps it is a result of the reported incidents of sexual harassment in the first Gulf war or Tailhook.

I do not want to give my views on these letters. However, I would like to express my opinion on the women-in-combat issue from the Indian Military point of view, which I feel is based on the American experiment.

The question is not whether the Indian woman should be allowed to make a career in the military forces; neither is it whether she will make a good soldier, sailor, or airman; as the answer to these questions is affirmative. The question is, "By women joining the services, does it increase or enhance the existing efficiency, morale, and fighting spirit of the combat unit in the trenches or on the battleship at sea?" If the answer to this question is "no," then all other arguments concerning the women's role in the armed forces are irrelevant, and of an academic nature only.

The more specific question is, "For

the sake of satisfying a constitutional requirement of giving equal opportunities in the armed forces, are we creating unnecessary problems that will hinder the furtherance of national security?"

Notwithstanding the above, let's examine the role of women in the purely managerial jobs of the services. A recent management study indicates that women do better than men in the management of military tasks. Another study indicates that women do a better job than men in 28 of the 31 key military management categories, including productivity and generating ideas, but that they do poorly in handling frustration. This is a departure from traditional presumptions, which credit women with being mature team players, but not having skills associated with top leadership.

Traditionally women have been credited with having good intuitive skills, and the study confirms that they out-perform men in this area. However, the study also shows that women were stronger in more logic-based skills, such as getting things done on time, producing high quality work, generating ideas, problemsolving, and planning.

Although women were the same as men in one area—delegating responsibility—they were behind in the ability to handle pressure and cope with their own frustrations. The study did not aim to single out gen-

der differences at the outset, but rather to identify leadership abilities.

The 31 areas of military management abilities surveyed were broken down into 7 categories: problem-solving; planning; controlling; managing self; managing relationships; leading; and communicating. While women did better than men in 28 of the 31 areas and excelled by a wide margin in 25 areas, they were behind in a key area—self-promotion. The study concludes that women in the military need to be more assertive in demanding recognition for their efforts, because whether in the military or in industry, this will not be handed to them.

### Paraguay Politics Revisited

Sean W. Burges, *Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom*—George W. Bush's administration and the U.S. military are constantly under attack for lacking sensitivity and understanding of the roots and causes of international issues. My concern is that *Military Review* is contributing to the perpetuation of this stereotype by actively providing military planners and strategists with misleading information. At the heart of my concern is William W. Mendel's article, "Paraguay's Ciudad del Este and the New Centers of Gravity" (March-

April 2002). (See on-line at <<http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/FMSOPUBS/ISSUES/paraguay/paraguay.htm>>.)

While my Ph.D. thesis focuses on Brazilian foreign policy in the Americas during the Cardoso era, my research originally focused on Paraguay. What becomes immediately clear from Mendel's account is that his research on the contemporary political reality of that country is lacking. There is readily available material on Paraguay published by the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Washington, D.C. For a less anti-U.S. intervention source, see the works of internationally recognized scholars such as R. Andrew Nickson, University of Birmingham, UK; Peter Lambert, University of Bath, UK; or Frank O. Mora, Rhodes College, Memphis, Tennessee.

The following paragraph from Mendel's article is so full of errors that it makes the credibility of the rest of the article extremely questionable: "The turbulent political environment of Paraguay engendered lawlessness in Ciudad del Este. The country has suffered three coup attempts in the past 5 years. Popular army chief, General Lino Oviedo, who mounted a short-lived coup in 1998, was sentenced to 10 years in prison, then ran for president later the same year. While the supreme court declared Oviedo an illegal candidate, his running mate, Raul Cubas Grau, was elected president and quickly pardoned Oviedo. Cubas Grau resigned under pressure after the vice president was assassinated in March 1999; leaving the presidency to Luis Angel González Macchi who was next in line as senate president. Adding to the political turbulence, González Macchi fired 18 generals and more than 100 other officers who had supported Oviedo. After a May 2000 coup attempt, González Macchi terminated another 13 officers. Meanwhile, the party of Oviedo-supported Vice President Julio Cesar Franco, maneuvered to impeach González Macchi. The political tumult has done little to engender social economic progress in Paraguay, and only Brazil and Argentina's influence have kept the democratic government afloat. Needless to say, the govern-

ment in Asuncion has had little time to concentrate on improving the rule of law in Ciudad del Este."

To clarify the paragraph, I must add the following:

□ Oviedo is not Paraguay's Army chief, and has not been since 1996. He is in exile in Brazil.

□ Oviedo did not attempt a coup in 1998; he tried in 1996 but was rebutted by the combined pressures of the Argentine, Brazilian, and U.S. ambassadors. See Arturo Valenzuela's article, "The Coup that Didn't Happen" *Journal of Democracy* 8 (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, October 1997).

□ Oviedo began his campaign in 1997 when he defeated Argana, an individual who would have been no more palatable for the security concerns in this article ostensibly addresses than the exposed putschist general Oviedo.

□ Oviedo was not convicted by the supreme court. He was convicted by a specially-convened military court that conveniently timed its decision to not only exclude Oviedo from the vote, but also to prevent Argana from assuming the Colorado Party candidacy—the party that was all but guaranteed victory. This point is critical and sheds light on the larger questions Mendel addresses. Cubas pardoned Oviedo, but the supreme court overturned the pardon in a 5-4 vote, the exact Argana-Oviedo factional split on the bench.

□ It was not at all clear that González Macchi was next in line to assume the presidency. He received a special ruling from the supreme

court, which was dominated by members of the pro-Argana faction of the perpetually ruling Colorado Party.

□ Mendel did an enormous disservice to Franco, a member of the liberal party, by suggesting that he needed Oviedo's support and that he might be aligned with him.

□ Franco did not try to arrange González Macchi's impeachment; the liberal party arranged it after González Macchi consistently failed to do anything to help Paraguay, after a government of national unity had collapsed, and after González Macchi had mired himself in a morass of corruption charges. The Colorado Party supported González Macchi's impeachment on the condition that Franco resign the vice presidency, despite the absence of any culpability on his part.

□ Firing the officers and exiling the military units from the capital was one of the greatest services done for Paraguay in recent years. Although the political rhetoric stayed heated after the move, the tanks stopped rolling through the streets. A related point concerns Paraguay's military history in which Mendel fails to mention that promotions were being linked to Colorado Party membership and support of the correct faction during General Alfredo S. Stroessner's dictatorship. These things sometimes change slowly.

□ Argentine and Brazilian influence has kept democratic forms in place. The important question is why. Authoritarian relapse means exclusion from Mercosul, which means collapse of large branches

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of the smuggling industry.

□ Why would the president want to crack down on Ciudad del Este? Colorado Party political power is tied to networks of corruption and contraband. R. Andrew Nickson has published excellent articles on the roots and legacies of this reality.

I here point out 10 points of serious criticism and factual error. To be frank, I am not a fan of the military in any country. However, I do recognize that the military can be a positive factor in many situations, but only if it has reliable intelligence and briefing material as well as extremely clear terms of reference. The last thing the majority of honest Paraguayans need is a heavy-handed task force from the United States operating on the precepts in Mendel's article. Given the problems with his

article, I suggest that you contract a serious U.S.-based academic to author a more accurate assessment of the situation.

### Mendel Rebuttal

Colonel William Mendel, *U.S. Army, Retired, Shalimar, Florida*—It is gratifying to learn that Ph.D. candidate Sean W. Burges is researching Latin American issues. That important region is too often seen as a low priority, and it certainly deserves attention. Although Burges frankly states, "I am not a fan of the military," he was gracious in his letter to provide this old soldier an extensive summary of ideas and resources to improve a paragraph of the article that Burges found wanting. I am grateful for his interest in regional security.

### Correction

Brian J. Dunn, *Research Analyst, Lansing, Michigan*—I was glad to see my article "Transforming USAREUR" appear in the November-December 2003 *Military Review*. However, I was listed as having a Ph.D., and I do not. My biography and resume list me with a B.A. from the University of Michigan and an M.A. from Eastern Michigan University. Lest somebody think I am fluffing a resume, I would certainly appreciate a correction in the next issue. If the on-line version could be corrected, I would appreciate that too. Thank you again for your efforts on this article.

*Editor's note:* MR regrets the error. We have corrected the on-line version.

